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Abstract  
Organizations use diverse types of security solutions to prevent cyber-attacks. Multiple vendors provide 
security solutions developed using heterogeneous technologies and paradigms. Hence, it is a challenging 
rather impossible to easily make security solutions to work an integrated fashion. Security orchestration 
aims at smoothly integrating multivendor security tools that can effectively and efficiently interoperate to 
support security staff of a Security Operation Centre (SOC). Given the increasing role and importance of 
security orchestration, there has been an increasing amount of literature on different aspects of security 
orchestration solutions. However, there has been no effort to systematically review and analyze the 
reported solutions. We report a Multivocal Literature Review that has systematically selected and reviewed 
both academic and grey (blogs, web pages, white papers) literature on different aspects of security 
orchestration published from January 2007 until July 2017. The review has enabled us to provide a working 
definition of security orchestration and classify the main functionalities of security orchestration into three 
main areas – unification, orchestration, and automation. We have also identified the core components of a 
security orchestration platform and categorized the drivers of security orchestration based on technical 
and socio-technical aspects. We also provide a taxonomy of security orchestration based on the execution 
environment, automation strategy, deployment type, mode of task and resource type. This review has 
helped us to reveal several areas of further research and development in security orchestration. 
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General and reference → Survey and overviews; Security and privacy; Software 
engineering 
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1. Introduction 
The cybersecurity breaches lead to serious organizational and socio-economic consequences such as 
loss of revenue, damage to reputation and information system, theft of proprietary data and customer 
sensitive information [1-4]. For example, Equifax (one of the largest credit reporting agencies in America) 
[5] reported a major data breach that had affected around 148 million US consumers [6-8]. The hackers 
successfully stole sensitive information (e.g., credit card number, phone number, email address, and social 
security number) through that breach, which was preventable as per a recent report. According to a 
research sponsored by IBM, the average total cost of a breach is around $3.62 million per incident [4]. 
Organizations are using various security solutions to prevent known and unknown attacks and avoid 
the consequences usually associated with security vulnerabilities and threats [9, 10]. Some of the 
commonly used security solutions are antivirus, Firewall, Intrusion Detection Systems and Instruction 
Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS), and Security Information and Events Management (SIEM) [9, 11-13]. The 
security solutions providers use different technologies and paradigms to develop, deploy, and operate their 
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security solutions, which cannot be easily integrated and interoperated for effectively and efficiently 
supporting Security Operation Centre (SOC). 
Security orchestration is aimed at introducing technical and socio-technical solutions to integrate 
multivendor security tools as a unified whole to support security staff in a SOC. Organizations are 
increasingly adopting security orchestration platforms that are proactive, autonomous, and collaborative 
solutions to enable security staff perform their responsibilities effectively and efficiently [14-17]. A security 
orchestration initiative enables peoples, practices, and technologies to work together to improve 
organizations’ security intelligence for better security operations and management [18-20]. Security 
orchestration is a prerequisite of security automation, which is the process of automatically detecting, 
preventing, and recovering from cyber-attacks without human interference using information technology, 
automation algorithm, and artificial intelligence [19, 21]. 
Existing security solutions are designed to monitor an organization’s IT infrastructures and network 
activities, generate security alerts, and perform necessary actions upon detection of security threats. An 
organization’s cybersecurity solutions generate thousands of alerts, which are usually monitored and acted 
upon by security staff, mostly using manual or semi-automated processes and practices [21-23]. A 
Verizon’s report indicates that 93% of the data breach cases require minutes to be executed, but it took 
companies weeks or months to discover the attacks [24]. For example, after getting alerts from IDS for 
malicious behaviors, a security expert might go to an endpoint defense system to gather more relevant 
information by querying network resources and validating the threat. After confirming the threat, a 
security expert commands a Firewall to isolate or block the traffic from the affected region and update the 
threat information in the threat intelligence. According to BakerHostetler [25], security experts took on 
average 61 days to discover the occurrence of an incident and after discoveries 41 more days to take 
remedial actions. A food chain, Wendy’s Point of Sale systems were affected by malware at 1025 locations 
in 2015, but it was first discovered in February 2016 [26, 27]. To deal with the potential threats to security 
breaches, security experts are expected to provision and facilitate the selection of existing security 
solutions as quickly as possible to provide the required security services and ensure seamless security 
operation. 
A security orchestration solution has the potential to address the concerns of manual threat analysis, 
delays in responses to security incidents as well as provide security status of an organization’s ICT 
infrastructure. Security orchestration solutions are capable of automatically identify suspicious activities 
in an organization environment, and proactively act to mitigate a cyber-attack. According to a Gartner’s 
report, by 2019 30% of the large and medium enterprises will be deploying some forms of security 
automation and orchestration capabilities [28]. Another study [23] reports one third of organizations are 
planning to deploy or have deployed security orchestration solutions that can bundle different security 
solutions and human expertise together for the automation of security services within an organization. 
Fig. 1 captures some of the abovementioned organizational settings where several types of security 
solutions generate alerts to be manually analyzed by security staff in the absence of a security orchestration 
platform that can automate most of the manual decision-making process against a threat incident. Security 
orchestration platform integrates security tools to accelerate incident response by reducing the manual 
and repetitive activities. Orchestrating and automating the activities of multivendor security solutions 
require a comprehensive view of the orchestration platform as these solutions have their own way to work 
and produce different formats of alerts. The existing security orchestration solutions do not provide 
sufficient evidence for supporting different quality attributes such as flexibility, interoperability, scalability, 
modifiability, accuracy, and extensibility [16, 17, 29-33]. Given the increasing demand for security 
orchestration, a significant amount of research is needed to help understand the challenges in security 
orchestration, existing solutions, and practices to address the challenges. 
This paper reports a Multi-Vocal Literature Review (MLR) that aimed at systematically identifying and 
reviewing the literature on the security orchestration “state of the art” and “state of the practice”. An MLR 
(i.e., a type of Systematic Literature Review) includes both peer reviewed and non-peer reviewed literature 
(e.g.,  newsletters, white papers, fact sheets, and blog posts) [34, 35]. Systematic Literature Review (SLR) 
has become the most popular methods of conducting a literature review in Software Engineering (SE) [36]. 
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Fig. 1 Overview of an organization decision against alerts without security orchestration and with security 
orchestration 
SLR focuses only on research contribution and does not include grey literature. SLR cannot always provide 
an established discipline of knowledge as it ignores a large amount of information produced by software 
engineering practitioners [34, 35, 37 ]. Hence, MLR is attracting more attention to SE [34, 38]. We believe 
that conducting MLR in the area of security orchestration will be more useful compared to SLR as there is 
a large body of non-peer reviewed literature reported by practitioners. This MLR has explored the 
fundamental challenges and opportunities for the evolution of security orchestration. We have analyzed 
the characteristics of the existing security orchestration technologies to understand how to solve the 
security orchestration challenges. We have also investigated the strength and weakness of the reported 
security orchestration technologies. The main contributions of this MLR are: 
 It introduces a working definition of security orchestration, followed by several functionalities of 
security orchestration ranging from integrating several security solutions to performing incident 
response planning against a threat as well as collaborative security solutions to materialize the 
concept of security orchestration (refer to sections 3 & 4 for further details) 
 It identifies the key challenges that practitioners and researchers intend to overcome through 
security orchestration (details are discussed in section 5). 
 It provides a taxonomy of different aspect of security orchestration practices needed to support 
dynamic adoption of applications within the organization environment (detail in section 6). 
 It determines and discusses the open research challenges/issues in the field of security 
orchestration (refer to sections 7 & 8).   
2. Research Method 
The methodology used for this review has benefited from the SLR guideline reported in [39]; there are 
no specific guidelines available for conducting MLR in SE. Hence, our study’s methodology was inspired by 
the work reported in [40, 41]. The study methodology involves three main phases: planning and designing 
the review protocol, conducting the review, and reporting the review. We developed a review protocol 
describing each step of MLR. The review protocol includes several steps: research identification, search 
strategies, study selection, data extraction, and synthesis. Our MLR process followed the steps in the same 
order as shown in Fig.  2. 
2.1.  Research Identification 
We identified the relevant literature using a search strategy that was based on a set of research questions, 
as shown in Table 1. The research questions purported to help gain an understanding of security 
orchestration,  
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Fig.  2 An overview of our MLR process 
Table 1 Research Questions of this MLR 
Research Questions Motivation 
RQ1. What is Security Orchestration? The first question (RQ1) investigates how security orchestration is 
defined. RQ1 aims at identifying the relevant related work, i.e., 
identifying keywords for literature search that leads to a maximum 
coverage of the related approaches. RQ1 also investigates the functional 
features and core elements of security orchestration. 
RQ2. What challenges security 
orchestration intend to solve? 
Security orchestration is commonly used by practitioners to bring 
automation, streamline incident response, and integrate security tools. 
Many challenges that exist for security solutions in a more traditional 
setting also apply to security orchestration. RQ2 focuses on the aspects 
where security orchestration fundamentally differs compared to 
traditional approaches. 
RQ3. What types of solutions have been 
proposed? 
RQ3.1. What practices have been 
reported for adopting security 
orchestration? 
RQ3.2. What types of tools and 
techniques researchers and practitioners 
use, propose, design, and implement in 
practice? 
RQ3.3. What aspects of architecture 
security practitioners consider for large-
scale deployment of security 
orchestration? 
The motive behind this question is to identify the solutions related to 
security orchestration and the reported practices followed by 
organizations (i.e., requirements, guidelines, and collaborative 
approaches) for adopting security orchestration (RQ3.1), more 
specifically how existing tools are employed to implement; what are the 
innovative approaches and technique needed for successful 
implementation of security orchestration (RQ3.2); and most importantly 
what aspects of architecture are being considered for large-scale 
deployment of security orchestration (RQ3.3). RQ3 would help enable 
researchers to find the gap and practitioners to consider the 
architectural aspects that need to be considered to successfully 
implement security orchestration on a larger scale. 
 
the functions and their respective elements of security orchestration. The research questions also aimed at 
helping in identifying and reviewing the supportive tools, approaches, evaluation criteria for adopting 
security orchestration in practice. 
2.2. Search Strategy 
Following sections detail the search strategy for acquiring the relevant literature from multiple sources. 
2.2.1. Data Sources. Our review includes both peer reviewed and grey literature that was identified and 
acquired using both manual and automatic searches in the relevant sources. Initially, we performed a 
manual search on the Journal of Computer Security, ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, and USENIX Security Symposium to gain an overview of the recent literature. We 
also searched the recent proceedings of RSA conferences. Then we conducted the automatic search in three 
digital libraries, IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, and Scopus, that publish peer reviewed literature on 
computing. We used the advanced search option to facilitate the search that allows multiple keywords 
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search. During the automatic search in the digital libraries, we defined the search to match the search string 
with the titles, abstracts, and keywords of the papers published between January 2007 and July 2017. Our 
search in ACM DL, IEEE Xplore, and Scopus include the paper from Annual Computer Security Applications 
Conference and IEEE Security and Privacy. We additionally searched in Google Scholar to search and 
include some relevant literature, especially some patents that we could have missed through the 
abovementioned search procedure. 
To search the grey literature, we used the Google search engine like other MLRs [37, 38]. We search the 
first ten pages, which was considered sufficient to find the most relevant literature as Google search 
engine’s algorithm retrieves and shows the most relevant results in the first few pages [37, 38]. For 
example, Google search engine returned 45,900 results for the term “security orchestration” in November 
2017; however, the relevant content is captured in the first ten pages. 
2.2.2. Search Strings. We created a search string to ensure a thorough search over several databases. 
For academic literature, we formulated the search string based on a) the key terms gathered from the 
relevant papers, b) synonym, alternative terms, and related concepts of security orchestration, c) AND and 
OR to combine all the terms. We performed several pilot searches and refined, discarded, and added search 
terms to confirm the inclusion of the relevant papers that we already knew. We formulated the search 
string in three parts. We performed a match of the search string with the paper’s titles, abstracts, and 
keywords. We used the following search string. 
 
Search 
String 1 
(“Security" OR "Alert" OR "Threat" OR "Policy" OR "Intrusion" OR "Anomaly Detection" OR "forensic") 
AND (“Orchestration" OR "Instrumentation" OR "Coordination" OR "Correlation" OR "Collaboration" OR "Automation" 
OR "Integration")  
AND ("Security Tool" OR "Safeguard Software" OR "IDS" OR "IPS" OR "Threat Intelligence" OR "Detection Engine" OR 
"Prevention Engine" OR "Security Control" OR "Security Appliance" OR "perimeter defense" OR "Incident Response") 
We used the search string “(Security AND Orchestration)” to search grey literature and conducted a search 
on the Google search engine and Google Scholar. 
2.3. Eligibility Criteria 
We defined a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria to select the papers. The criteria are shown in Table 
2. Since this review is a blend of scientific and grey literature, we used a rather narrow inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. 
Table 2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
 IC1: Articles in English and full text is accessible.  
 IC2: Articles that focus on developing integrated, 
coordinated and collaborative solutions. 
 IC3: Articles include a sound validation (for grey 
source: working prototype or tools, proper references 
to validate the result) 
 IC4: Articles that reports practices and challenges in 
cyberspace (such as blogs, magazine reports) to give an 
indication towards orchestration.  
 EC1: Short academic paper (paper less than 6 
pages). 
 EC3: Article whose focus is irrelevant to 
security.  
 EC4: Article that focuses on physical 
infrastructure or hardware. 
 EC5: Article that focuses to enhance algorithms 
or features of a single security solution.   
 EC6: All duplicate articles found from various 
sources. 
2.4. Study Selection 
Fig.  3 shows the details of the selection of grey and academic literature at each step of this MLR. This 
also includes the search databases and a number of papers selected after each step. We followed two 
different approaches to selecting the academic and grey literature. 
2.4.1. Selection of Academic Literature. In this section, we describe each step of the process of selecting 
the relevant papers. Our search in ACM DL, IEEE Xplore, and Scopus returned 271, 600 and 1017 results, 
respectively. The titles, abstracts, and keywords of these papers were examined. For some papers, just 
reading the title and abstract was not enough to decide whether to keep them in the selected papers’ pool. 
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We kept those papers for the next round. A total of 1617 papers were discarded based on the inclusion 
criteria described in Table 2.  
We read the title, abstract and keywords of each paper in the Journal of Computer Security, the ACM 
SIGSAC series of Conferences on Computer and Communications Security, and the RSA series conferences 
and filtered 19 papers. After round 1, we selected 290 papers. Then we removed the duplicates and 
excluded the papers that were shorter than 6 pages. Finally, we screened the whole text and applied the 
eligibility criteria to select the relevant papers. A total of 37 papers were selected from the digital libraries. 
To ensure the inclusion  
 
Fig.  3  Study selection process of our MLR 
of the relevant papers that we might have missed, we extended the search in Google Scholar. We searched 
for the string “Security and Orchestration” and checked both the titles and abstracts of the top 200 results. 
We only included 6 articles that were not found in the automatic and manual search procedures of phase 
1. We applied all the eligibility criteria while selecting the papers from Google Scholar. 
2.4.2. Selection of Grey Literature. In the next phase, we used the Google search engine and checked the 
first 10 pages. We only continued further if needed. We identified several practitioners (niche and start-
up) who were contributing to the field of security orchestration. We crawled through their websites and 
looked for the relevant resources and white papers. We applied the eligibility criteria while selecting the 
papers. At the end of this process, we identified a total of 52 papers that include white papers, blogs, news 
articles, and websites. 
Finally, we included 95 pieces of literature (Fig.  3) for data extraction and synthesis. Fig.  4 showed the 
distribution of the selected pieces over several types of venues. For both cases, we excluded the papers 
published before 2007. Table 3 enlists the pieces of work that was finally reviewed. 
Table 3. Study selected for data extraction and qualitative analysis 
Academic Literature 
Grey Literature 
Websites & Blogs Whitepaper 
[16, 17, 30-33, 42-78] = 43 [11, 13-15, 18, 20-23, 79-100] = 31 [12, 19, 29, 101-118] = 21 
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Fig.  4 Distribution of selected articles over venues 
2.5. Data Extractions, Synthesis, and Analysis 
Following the process of MLR, at this step, we read, assessed, extracted data, and summarized the 
findings from the selected papers based on the pre-defined RQs and motivators (Table 1). 
2.5.1. Data Extraction. We identified and extracted the relevant data using a pre-defined data extraction 
form from each of the selected sources that we needed to answer the research questions. We also extracted 
some general information, e.g., authors name, venue published and published year. We conducted a pilot 
study on a set of 10 sources before deciding about how to extract the required data. We stored all the 
extracted data in a spreadsheet for analysis. 
2.5.2. Synthesis and Analysis. The extracted data were stored in different sections of the data extraction 
form (a) security orchestration definitions, functionalities and application, (b) challenges to be solved and 
(c) security orchestration practices, tools, and techniques, to perform the synthesis and analysis of the 
extracted data. We analyzed each set of the data items using qualitative analysis methods. We used a 
combination of different qualitative analysis methods (i.e., narrative synthesis and thematic analysis). For 
example, for classification and categorization of data, we used thematic analysis [119, 120]. We followed 
several steps to analyze the data including getting familiar with the extracted data by carefully reading each 
piece of the data. We collaboratively analyzed and systematically synthesis the extracted data for 
developing a taxonomy to report the results in a generalized form. The taxonomy developed in this study 
has been used for reporting the functionalities, benefits, and aspects of security orchestration in this paper. 
For data analysis, we followed the qualitative data analysis guidelines [120]. We have included a table of 
abbreviations, Table 6 at the appendix, used in this paper. We report the synthesis result in section 3, 4, 5, 
and 6. 
3. Security Orchestration: Definitions, Functionalities, and Elements 
This section presents the findings for RQ1 “What is Security Orchestration?”. Our data analysis for RQ1 
reveals some key definitions of “security orchestration”  given by practitioners, the functional and non-
functional requirements, and the key functional components of security orchestration. 
3.1. Definitions 
Our analysis shows that practitioners widely use the term security orchestration with no clear and 
common definition. We assert that having a common working definition of security orchestration will help 
practitioners and researchers to define a discipline of research and practice for promoting practices, 
processes, and tools. The term security orchestration is being mostly used as a Buzz-word that can lead to 
misinterpretation of the core concept of orchestration [18, 83, 84, 102]. Some organizations and 
practitioners confuse security orchestration with security automation [23]. We present a few key 
definitions from the reviewed work. 
According to HEXADITE, "Orchestration is the practice of connecting existing security tools together 
through APIs to streamline incident response processes." Here Hexadite has considered orchestration 
more as an integration tool and presented a definition for security automation. Barak Klinghofer, CPO of 
HEXADITE  [13] has defined "The active process of Mimicking ideal steps of a human would take to 
investigate a cyber threat, determining whether the threat requires actions, performing necessary 
remediation actions, deciding what additional investigation should be next" as security automation [104]. 
According to a start-up company KOMAND [11], security orchestration is more than just connecting 
security tools. Their definition [11] is - 
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“Security orchestration is a method of connecting security tools and integrating disparate security 
systems. It is the connected layer that streamlines security processes and powers security 
automation.” 
Markets&Markets [91] state that “Security orchestration is an approach to automatically respond to 
security incident and protect IT systems in organization from advanced cyber-attacks and vulnerabilities”. 
Microsoft has distinguished security automation and security orchestration [21] - 
“Security Automation is the use of information technology in place of manual processes for cyber 
incident response and security event management” and “Security orchestration is the integration of 
security and information technology tools designed to streamline process and drive security 
automation”. 
ThreatConnect [86] has presented distinct definitions for security automation and security orchestration- 
“Security automation is the automatic handling of a task in a machine-based security application 
that otherwise be done manually by a cybersecurity professional” and “Security orchestration is the 
connecting and integration of various security application and process together” [86]. 
ThreatConnect has defined security automation and orchestration [86], “Security automation and 
orchestration is a coordination of automated security tasks across connected security application and 
process.” 
According to Forrester, security automation and orchestration should be described together as 
technology products. They have defined security automation and orchestration [83] as- 
“Technology products that provide automated, coordinated, and policy-based action of security 
processes across multiple technologies, making security operations faster, less error-prone, and 
more efficient.” 
Clearly, Forrester’s definition asserts that automation can help take the full benefits from security 
orchestration. Bruce Schneier [14], chief security officer of IBM, has stated security orchestration as the 
unification of people, process, and technology. He claims that security orchestration is keeping people in 
the loop of security automation where the computer performs the automation of certain activities, but a 
human coordinate the activities. It is more about making people effective. He also pointed out that the 
security incident response needs to be dynamic and agile. DFLabs’s Oliver Rochford has defined security 
orchestration as the junction where people, process, and technology all come together [18]. According to 
him, people build automation into the process and consume information and insight generated by 
technology. Security orchestration is the realization of three paradigms – integration, orchestration, and 
automation. Our definition of security orchestration is:              
“Security Orchestration is the planning, integration, cooperation, and coordination of the activities 
of security tools and experts to produce and automate required actions in response to any security 
incident across multiple technology paradigms.” 
This definition provides siloed security solutions the ability to share information and threat intelligence 
among them through a unified platform. This is achieved by seamless monitoring, situation awareness, data 
analytics, knowledge representations, and semantic knowledge sharing among the existing security 
solutions. It is clear that there is a need for extensive training to learn from human behavior to provide AI 
capabilities that can enable an enterprise for long-lasting development and deployment of security 
solutions using the existing tools and protocols. Security orchestration works as an intelligence assistant 
for security experts. 
3.2. Functionalities of Security Orchestration                     
In this section, we report the findings of the functionalities of security orchestration. Several reports 
(i.e., [83, 101]) have mentioned security orchestration as one of the emerging technologies, which has the 
potential of being widely adopted in near the future [101]. One of the motivators of the security 
orchestration is to bridge the gap between detection and remediation of security incidents [13, 111]. Most 
of the detection solutions are automated where the response processes are still reliant on human. To bridge 
this gap, there is a need to unify the activities of security tools, streamline the workflows, and choose the 
right course of actions. According to Demisto [115], a comprehensive security orchestration platform must 
be able to automate security tools activities, create playbook with complicated logic, and track and 
orchestrate the tasks assigned to an analyst. Paul Weeden  [94] has stated: “Security orchestration makes 
the most of human skills by bringing together automated tools and reports to provide risk information exactly 
when and where it is needed.” Fig. 5 highlights the key functionalities of security orchestration in three 
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paradigms, integration where a security orchestration acts as a middleware, orchestration that is the 
process of translating complex process into streamlining workflow and automation that enable an 
automated response. 
 
Fig. 5 Key functionalities provided by Security Orchestration 
3.2.1. Middleware/ Hub. Vendors have mentioned security orchestration as a platform that acts as a hub 
for unification, coordination, data sharing and analysis for disparate cybersecurity and IT technologies [12, 
16, 106]. Security analyst can easily integrate multivendor security tools, share threat intelligence, 
collaborate with the external organizations to get an insight of  an organization’s security state through an 
orchestration platform. SDSec orchestration solution has a layer of functionalities to perform 
communication and coordination among different subsystems [31]. 
Unify security tools: Several of the reviewed work mentioned that security orchestration unifies 
disparate security tools and processes [11-13, 23, 30, 62, 108, 121], integrates enterprise security 
architecture [101, 115], connects detection, networks and endpoint security systems [17, 111], and 
perform coordination among security tools activities [16, 19, 23, 43]. Connecting the activities of disparate 
security tools makes the incident handling process efficient and effective for security analyst. Security 
orchestration platform provides a single console or platform to integrate security tools activities, removes 
the operational silos, and helps security experts to free their time [93, 109]. Unifying intelligence according 
to vulnerability also minimizes the overall complexity of the incident response process [30, 43, 53]. 
Through the coordination platform, security tools can interoperate with each other to enhance 
organizational protection and defense systems [62, 95, 112]. Feitosa et al. [49] propose collaborative 
solutions to detect intrusion and anomalies by analyzing the co-creation of events and alerts among 
different subnetwork. The orchestration tools proposed in [16] are designed to coordinate the 
safeguarding function by calling an individual software package with respect to an installation. Jeong et al. 
have proposed a coordination module for organization architecture integrating cyber forensic functions 
[78]. 
Determine endpoint for human investigation: A security orchestration platform [83] can enable 
security experts to get insights into several security controls activities, operate disparate tools as a unified 
system [17, 19], and to collaborate with other experts for planning and decision making [11, 93, 95]. The 
security orchestration solution informs and educates security analyst about threat behaviors [83] and 
notifies about the supported policies [111]. By orchestrating various activities, a system can decide when 
human insight is required [11, 13, 75, 84, 102, 110]. For example, the work in [42] also highlights the critical 
assets with high priority to the administrator for investigation. The motive is to keep analyst focus on 
threats that demand their immediate attention and expertise. 
Share contextual insight: A single security prevention and detection system usually suffers from the 
tunnel vision syndrome that leads to an inability to detect certain types of attacks such as Distributed Daniel 
of Service (DDoS). A security orchestration platform gathers threat intelligence from various external 
sources (e.g., web pages and blogs), extracts key features from a huge volume of threat intelligence data, 
Functionalities of 
Security 
Orchestration
Act as a 
Middleware/ Hub
Unify security tools
Determine endpoint for human investigation
Share contextual insight
Orchestrate Security 
Activities
Translate complex process into streamline 
workflow
Provide deployment model
Determine appropriate course of action
Enable Automated 
Response
Automate repetitive and manual task 
Automate policy enforcement across disparate 
solutions
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and provides the contextual insight related to alerts or attacks to a security analyst. In addition, it engages 
security tools to perform complete monitoring of endpoint [54, 101, 112], correlates their activities, and 
provides real-time visibility of known and unknown threats to security analyst [93, 96, 108]. An 
organization can share contextual device data with the third-party system [12, 111]. It helps security 
analyst to reduce and mitigate the risk exposure [108, 111], make a faster decision based on context  [17, 
75, 81, 110],  and gather an overview of what is happening in various subnetworks within an organization 
[12, 19, 20, 101]. By sharing the contextual insight, an orchestration platform works as a collaborative 
platform that also enables training the analyst based on past investigations [19, 81, 93].  The online 
evaluation framework proposed in [42] provides situational awareness to an organization so that it can 
take appropriate actions. By assessing the security state of an organizations’ different assets, the proposed 
framework helps administrator to identify compromised assets and prioritizes alerts [42]. A set of papers 
[30, 46, 48, 55] has proposed a platform for security experts and security solutions used to share their 
knowledge. Jeong et al. [78] have followed the structure of having a coordination group with a participant 
group to propagate the relevant information to the external work or another coordination group. 
RiskVision has proposed security orchestration solutions to unify stakeholders in business, IT and security 
solutions to provide automation for end-to-end cyber risk prevention and response [95]. 
3.2.2. Orchestrate Security Activities. 
Translate complex process into streamline workflow: After receiving alerts, security experts need to 
perform multiple steps to find the attacks, vulnerabilities, affected endpoints, and mitigation solutions. 
These steps include the complex process of data collection, investigation, remediation, evaluation of 
actions, and deciding the appropriate course of actions. Several papers [11, 13, 23, 29, 42, 86, 104, 106, 
115] have mentioned that the motivation of orchestration is to translate the complex process of threat 
investigation into a streamlined workflow through automation and orchestration. A streamlined workflow 
requires a standardized process that includes proper planning for incident response, policy execution, 
investigation, response action, and remediation process [31, 105, 108, 109]. The workflow is designed to 
mimic human activities of threat investigation to reduce the cumbersome manual process, human errors, 
and improve staff capabilities to incident response. Orchestrating and integrating security tools’ activities 
allow experts to simplify complex workflow, coordinate the flow of data and tasks, and enable the powerful 
machine to machine automation [11, 102, 108, 118, 121]. The task can be fully or partially automated based 
on the complexity of the threats [109]. ForeScout has proposed a rule engine and a workflow engine to 
make instant decisions and offered data aggregation to provide in-depth awareness about the environment 
[101]. The online Evaluation framework, Seclius [42], translates alerts into system security measures to 
reduce the reliance on human expertise on capturing system characteristics through low-level alerts. This 
work also provides a raking of the affected systems assets and malicious events for organizations to help 
security administrator [42]. Similar to this, the Premise-aware Security Instrumentation (PSI) policy engine 
proposed in [33], translates the high-level security postures provided by an administrator into per device 
intents. 
Provide deployment model: Several security vendors provide orchestration deployment services that 
require appropriate orchestration and automation of existing security tools along with organization 
external and internal infrastructures [47, 51, 80, 85, 89].  FireEye deployment service for automation 
provides functionality to manage events across multiple FireEye and third-party products and ensures 
deployment is successful  [80]. Deployment model depends on organizations’ scale, complexity, and course 
of actions. Vendors are providing flexible deployment model for organizations to ensure simple installation 
and management of various infrastructure. This action also ensures efficient deployment in heterogeneous 
environments. Organizations can choose security policies based on their need to restrict the access and 
tailor security configurations [29, 113]. Additionally, the testing and evaluation of deployment model are 
also done once any change has been made. The proposed system can provide a progressive deployment 
module to perform upstream rules filtering that helps to reach the source of attacks [46]. The work in [47] 
proposes an innovative solution to perform quick deployment of various security mechanisms. The 
orchestration system proposed by [51] arranges appropriate virtual instances in the right place - virtual 
appliances are automatically added and controlled. It also automatically moves traffic to virtual network to 
prevent major harm, blocks the attack, and strengthens the system. 
Determine appropriate course of actions: A security orchestration platform can help promptly resolve 
an incident to determine the appropriate and effective course of actions [13, 31, 80, 85, 92, 93, 115]. By 
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choosing the appropriate course of actions, security orchestration maintains process consistency across a 
security program. FireEye has mentioned the in-built course of actions with automated support for all the 
needed steps for handling a security incident as a core of an orchestration platform [80]. Also, various kind 
of alerts (i.e., phishing, and endpoint contamination) are needed to distinguish remediation activities with 
different courses of actions. Upon investigating an alert, an orchestration platform can determine the 
proactive response to threats, or may initiate an additional investigation based on an attack’s complexity 
[80, 84, 111]. In many cases, a post-attack investigation or evaluation task can also be instantiated. Feitosa 
et al. [49] have proposed a framework, “Orchestration-oriented Anomaly Detection System (OADS)”, that 
performs coordination and collaboration among different anomaly detection techniques to detect and 
evaluate threats and choose right actions. Security experts do multiple investigations in response to an 
alert. In the process of orchestration, one investigation usually triggers multiple investigations [13].  
Workflows are designed to choose the appropriate course of actions, simplify threat response through 
integration and automation [11, 12, 108], perform necessary remediation [111], decide additional 
investigation [104], design documents for playbook review [80], and define sources of information to help 
expert in solving the identified problems [107]. A formal workflow helps maintain effective communication 
and strong collaboration among cybersecurity teams [104]. Providing a formal workflow helps security 
experts and orchestration platform to maintain consistency across actions [108]. This simplifies and 
accelerates alerts investigation, eases proactive hunting of attackers, accelerates Return on Investment 
(ROI), and eliminates the need for continuous assessment. The security functions are dynamically inserted 
into the workgroup based on the policies [29]. The operating principle of the framework in [17] has security 
controls that operate on their own and perform functions of context sensing, policy decision and policy 
enforcement. Each function is logically independent of each control. The orchestration tool proposed in 
[16] works as an interface to perform security scanning and testing or other security functions. This tool 
enables different safeguard software packages to come to an agreement for invoking the necessary 
function(s) owned by any of the software packages. The framework discussed in [78] helps to effectively 
implement the coordination of an organization's functions by performing an on-site and online 
investigation to provide security warnings and appropriate response actions. 
3.2.3. Enable Automated Response. Security orchestration automate incident response activities. 
HEXADITE has automated 800,000 man-hours of work in two years that is equivalent to $38.5 million in 
customer savings [13]. Several papers [12, 13, 81, 101] have reported that security orchestration automates 
the entire threat defense life cycle and provides intelligence automation services.  ETSI (European 
Telecommunication Standard Institute) has considered automating the control of deployment and 
configuration of the security functions as a substantial prerequisite of orchestration [52]. According to 
Forrester, orchestrating the incident response activities enable automated response without the need for 
coding skills [83]. Orchestration allows autonomous control and protection of network through discovered 
insights [111]. 
Automate repetitive manual task: Vendors use a security orchestration platform to automate 
repeatable tasks and remove duplicate incidents to optimize security staff’s capability and reduce the 
overall cost [11, 21, 81, 90, 96, 108, 111, 113, 121]. Automating the routine tasks help security experts to 
tackle more critical problems [11, 12, 23, 86, 104, 111]. According to Swimlane, 80% to 90 %of all security 
operations of an incident response can be automated to some extent [117]. The collaborative incident 
response planning process design discussed in [45] helps practitioners to come up with the repeatable and 
executable planning process. Some vendors provided a platform that also automates the deployment of 
security functions through a network infrastructure [29]. Several papers [30, 47, 84, 95] have proposed to 
automate the analysis of cyber threat intelligence, that includes extracting data from technical blogs, 
websites, finding correlation among different reported attacks, and updating incident severity based on 
threat intelligence feeds. An orchestration platform decreases the response time by minimizing error-
prone manual process and codifying real-world expertise. Koyama et al. have also reported a security 
operations automation framework that helps in optimizing decisions with regards to a variety of security 
sensors and appliances [30]. Luo et al. [31] have automated cybersecurity operations in the software-
defined environment. 
Automate policy enforcement: Security policy enforcement greatly benefit from automation that 
considers all the tools, devices, and measures required for a security policy implementation. Security 
orchestration enables an organization to automate policy enforcement and configuration at runtime [29, 
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32, 33, 52, 60, 62, 106]. A set of systems developed to derive policy decision based on contextual data and 
provide real-time policy enforcement, have been reported in [17, 32, 60]. Yu et al. [33] have introduced a 
multistage mapping mechanism to automatically adjust policies based on network devices. In [32], policy 
enforcement is performed automatically. ETSI has aligned the security policies in an automated way inside 
virtual, physical, and hybrid network [52]. Dynamic enforcement of policies allows automatic configuration 
of security elements and update of threat intelligence [29]. An organization can automate policy 
enforcement across disparate solutions [111]. Luo et al. [31] have proposed to provide consistent security 
policies by orchestrating software defined security services across a heterogeneous cloud environment. A 
generic security orchestration framework proposed in [17] enables ad-hoc, context-aware policy criteria 
to be applied in real time by using an ecosystem of security control connected via Data Exchange Layer 
(DXL). 
3.3. Quality Requirement for Security Orchestration Platform 
We have identified the key quality requirements of a security orchestration platform. Fig.  6 shows the 
main quality attributes of security orchestration platform gathered from the existing literature.  
 
Fig.  6 Quality Attributes of Security Orchestration Platform 
These are the functional and non-functional requirements of security orchestration system. Every 
organization needs to consider these attributes before adopting or implementing a security orchestration 
platform. The quality requirements of a large-scale system are expected to guide the key architecture 
design decisions. Hexadite has mentioned the pre-requisite for security orchestration which is basically the 
quality requirement for security orchestration platform [105]. 
Table 4 enlists the quality attributes and a set of corresponding metrics that can be used to measure 
these attributes. For example, usability is a crucial factor for the effective utilization of a security 
orchestration system. A security orchestration platform requires to have a simple and powerful user 
interface that can be easily customized for different types of security orchestration users. An orchestration 
platform should have a flexible architecture so that each user can create a work environment according to 
their need for a service. 
4. Key Components of Security Orchestration 
Organizations and vendors must consider the key components of security orchestration platforms 
before adopting them. We have identified several core components of a security orchestration platform. 
Most of the reviewed studies have a combination of these components that we have categorized in three 
classes – unification, orchestration, and automation unit. This classification is based on the functionalities 
discussed in section 3.2. We have considered the external security tools as another key component of an 
orchestration platform because most of the orchestration vendors consider that an organization already 
own some security tools and use the functionalities of the existing security solutions. Fig.  7 presents the 
details of the classification of the security orchestration core components. All the modules proposed here 
comprise of learning capabilities, specific policies, and storage to store the threat data. These modules also 
store security policies and rules associated with various organizational assets and endpoints [31]. We 
consider organizations’ devices that can be a server, client personal devices – laptop, mobile, personal 
computer, or organization owned workstation and so on as endpoint. It helps a system to gather knowledge 
about the new threats and threats patterns. We do not include these in the presented classification to keep 
it simple. 
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Table 4 Quality attributes of a security orchestration 
Quality Attribute Measurement Metrics Articles 
Accuracy   Accuracy of diagnosis 
 Appropriate measure against attacks 
 Accurate classification and reliable taxonomies of threats 
 Data integrity 
[17, 30, 42, 43, 47, 49, 
50, 56, 59, 62, 63, 66, 
67, 74, 95, 101] 
Usability  Ease-of-use, easy to manage, connect, & repeat task, interruptible 
 Simplified user interface to control security tools  
 Simplification of security management task for network 
administrator & auditing module 
 User satisfaction 
 Higher analyst productivity  
 Accessible and stable threat intelligence 
[13, 16, 19, 31, 42, 44, 
45, 51, 53, 65, 73, 75, 
81, 86, 102, 105, 110] 
Scalability  Vendor agnostics,  
 Independent security policy orchestration 
 Extensible architecture 
[13, 29, 31, 32, 42, 44, 
46, 48, 63, 65, 73, 84, 
89, 101, 110] 
Executability  Qualitative and quantitative information about the current incident 
 Measurable security system,  
 Measurable goal 
 Security state of different assets of organization infrastructure 
[11-13, 22, 45, 53, 74, 
110] 
Trustworthiness 
(Reliability) 
 On human: expertise level, fairness to collaborator, reputation 
 On existing security tools – trust value, Predictability 
[17, 30, 42, 43, 45, 47-
50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 63, 
66, 78] 
Effectiveness  
& Efficiency 
 Increase in detection rate,  
 less overhead, do more work with existing staff 
 Reliance on human ability & satisfaction, optimize resource & 
performance 
 Predictable cost structure, indicator of compromise;  
 Key indicator to measure security effectiveness: Mean time to 
notification, remediation, & investigation 
 Speed of integration and speed of deployment 
[12, 17, 19, 29, 42, 45, 
54, 58, 59, 62, 65, 67, 
74, 77, 81, 92, 101, 105, 
110, 117] 
 
Timeliness/ Speed  Time to perform raid recovery 
 Time to detect, triage attack and remediation  
 Time need to analyze an attack, 
 Time for policy enforcement,  
 Delay in business activities,  
 Overall latency of packet processing,  
[12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 28, 
30, 44-46, 49, 51, 62, 
65-67, 73, 75, 84, 86, 
90, 101, 105, 110] 
Robustness  Robustness to DDoS 
 Capacity of attack detection,  
 Incident response capacity  
[12, 32, 46, 48, 61, 62, 
110] 
Flexibility  Feasible to update 
 Flexibility to design workflow automation 
 Flexibility to adapt process & accelerate response to all type of 
threats 
[17, 20, 31, 32, 49, 51, 
63, 65, 81, 84, 90, 96, 
101, 110] 
Visibility  What analysis are available and what are their abilities  
 Security state of the organization 
 Secure configuration guidelines 
[12, 13, 17, 29, 31, 50, 
53, 55, 64, 81, 90, 95, 
110] 
Adaptable  Compatibility with existing network topology and security 
appliance  
 Adaptable with current process 
[11-13, 33, 52, 56, 77, 
90, 110] 
Cost  Low computation cost 
 Cost effective security orchestration platform for mixed 
environment  
 Additional resource 
 Cost of ownership 
[12, 13, 29, 33, 44, 49, 
86] 
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Fig.  7  Categorization of core components of security orchestration 
4.1. Unification Unit 
Under this category, we have considered the components that are designed to unify the existing security 
tools activities. The unification unit works as middleware or hub as briefly discussed in 3.2.1.We consider 
data collector, alert pre-processor, and description module under this category. 
4.1.1. Description Module. This component refers to language and models to represent configuration, 
deployment, and control tasks of security orchestration. Luo et al. [31] proposed a system that requires an 
abstract service to be defined for the same type of security services. Security management is built using the 
API of abstract service. Luo et al. [31] proposed security control capability descriptor, that describes all 
types of security tools, inputs, and necessary attributes. The description module requires well-designed 
API to connect the existing security tools. The security service requirements and descriptors are derived 
from organizational security policies and controls respectively. The set of interfaces are mentioned as 
connectors in [31]. They have introduced two sets of interfaces: event connector and command connector. 
Both security and network events are received by the event connector [31]. These events come from 
external sources. The events connector also sends the information to the playbooks. The set of interfaces 
under command connector sends a command to a security control to modify their configurations and 
update operation behavior [31]. 
The orchestration platform needs a suitable API to help third-party integration and control the activities 
in different layers [63-65, 80, 93, 97]. Intel has proposed a bi-directional notification based API to 
orchestrate virtual security in Software Defined Data Centre (SDDC) [29]. The global threat intelligence 
platform supports dedicated tools to provide a simplified interface to a firewall’s control [30]. Swimlane 
also uses API to enable one-click automation [19]. As stated by Bernd [52], one of the main purposes of 
ETSI’s management and orchestration group is to control Network Function Virtualization (NFV) 
environment through virtualization and automation as much as possible. This work has enhanced NFV 
reference architecture with security orchestrator, the interaction of the security orchestrator with the 
existing NFV orchestrator and Virtual network function manager of the reference architecture. The 
workgroup also included tasks of the security orchestrator and the required interfaces to interact with. In 
this work, the author has stated how security is managed through orchestration in a virtualized network 
environment. The correlation module of alert correlation architecture proposed in [43] uses application 
interface with the reasoner for reply and request. The DXL layer proposed by McAfee for enterprise service 
bus works as a connector for diverse security elements and has an extensible data exchange framework to 
facilitate configuration of trustworthy data representation [17]. Safeguard interface module of enterprise-
level security orchestrator provides a layer of software for a consistent interface to abstract away the 
changing nature of the underlying safeguard software packages. 
4.1.2. Collector. Most of the reviewed security orchestration platforms have collectors to collect all the 
necessary information for integrating security tools or devices to its system. In several studies, network 
traffic and alerts are collected and pre-processed before analyzing and taking a decision [21, 44, 49, 60, 66, 
90, 94, 114]. The collector collects both raw context and structured format data [64]. The orchestration 
server engine of the security orchestration framework presented in [17] works as a collector and receives 
contextual data from clients. The orchestration platform discussed in [49] has OADS miner as a core 
component. The OADS miner works like a consultant to the overall system, which comprises of OADS 
crawler. The OADS crawler is designed to gather new information from the Internet about threats, 
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vulnerabilities, attacks, the origin of attacks and store them in a unique repository. The threat intelligence 
unit works as a blog scrapper that crawls through technical blogs to collect, gather, and share threat 
intelligence data [47, 64]. Security orchestration utilizes global threat intelligence platform to collect 
external threat intelligence and to prevent data infiltration (the action of entering or gaining action) and 
subsequent actions performed by attackers [30]. 
4.1.3. Pre-processor. A pre-processor receives raw alerts from several security tools and prepares the 
alerts for analysis. The alert pre-processor first decides the alert adequacy, and then it aggregates the alerts 
into clusters based on similarity. A pre-processing of threat data involves sentence splitting, special content 
extraction, content term location, topic classification, template removing, and content sanitizing [47, 60, 63, 
64, 74]. Feitosa et al. [49] have used the Intrusion Detection Message Format (IDMF) standard to aggregate 
the alerts of several IDS tools. The aggregation also helps to explore the distance between the times of 
different alerts, determine the alerts field, and make a hypothesis about alerts and defense strategies. The 
proposed architecture for collaborative Intrusion Detection System [44] also uses IDMEF to unify alerts 
from multiple IDS. In [31], the orchestration platform has a modular physical logical attribute mapping that 
maps all assets’ physical attributes to its corresponding logical attributes. The study in [43] has combined 
several knowledge representation languages, for example, IDMEF, TAXII, OVAL, STIX, NVD, to propose 
ontological conceptualization and divide the knowledge into several groups. Their proposed ontology-
based event correlation architecture consists of two essential modules, one is conversion, and another is 
the correlation module. The conversion module consists of parting reports, translator and ontology. 
4.1.4. Dashboard. The dashboard category consists of tools aimed at visualizing the activities of an 
orchestration platform. According to Demisto Inc. [114], the dashboard will bridge the gap between security 
operation center and technology used to keep the organization secure. The dashboard provides an 
aggregated view of different scenarios, assets, and metrics [85, 95, 114]. FireEye uses a centralized 
dashboard to facilitate advanced threat hunting [80]. In Enterprise Level Security Orchestrator [16], the 
security orchestration tool provides administration an interface through a dashboard. The dashboard can 
be designed to provide an integrated view of an organization’s overall system to help experts 
understanding the security states; for example, security experts can see all the scans in progress from a 
single console [16, 53, 75]. FireEye orchestration deployment service provides documents associated with 
cyber playbook review that helps orchestration operation team to understand the playbook [80]. Most of 
the reviewed systems generate some form of alerts reports for security experts [44, 65, 74]. Through these 
reports, security experts can get a high-level overview of an organizational security system. These reports 
also enable experts to identify the security state of critical assets and the affected networks or subnetworks 
within an organization. The reporting tools receive a recommendation from the remediation engine related 
to threats. Threat visualization and analysis is an important part of security orchestration. A set of papers 
have mentioned several web portal or public websites that provide a web interface to visualize the threats 
[30, 55]. 
4.2. Orchestration Unit 
One of the substantial pre-requisites of a security orchestrator is to automate the control of deployment 
and configuration of all the security requirements. For this category, we consider all the components that 
are required to perform the functionalities described in section 3.2.2. For example, the security 
orchestration framework describes in  [17] has provided a security orchestration engine to receive 
contextual data from clients. It comprises one or more logic element(s) which are designed to work with 
the contextual data. Koyama et al. [30] have proposed a three steps process to cope with new sophisticated 
unpredictable threats – collect, judge, and control. The operating principle of the proposed framework in 
[17] has security controls, which perform context sensing and based on the context generate and enforce 
security policy decisions. A security orchestrator needs to manage several activities as stated in [52, 58]. 
The proposed security orchestration solution performs central management of security service and trust. 
FireEye in their orchestration platform has used a specialized component, called case management for 
managing various cases. We categorize the orchestration unit into three modules threat intelligence, 
planning module and  detection module. 
4.2.1. Threat Intelligence Unit. Cyber threat intelligence can be considered as a database of evidence of 
existing and emerging attacks [47, 53, 64, 65, 73]. Threat intelligence consists of information related to 
attacks context, adversary strategies, mechanisms, indicators of compromise, possible course of actions, 
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tactics, and techniques [47, 85, 86, 91]. Threat intelligence plays a key role in security orchestration. An 
organization can gain the visibility of threat landscapes by using threat intelligence. It helps organizations 
to identify the early sign of attacks [47]. Organizations are collecting and exchanging threat intelligence 
data across several domains and stakeholders as Indicator of Compromise (IOC) [47, 61, 62]. Example of 
IOC can be forensics artifacts, virus signatures, IPs/ domain of botnets, and MD5 hashes of attacks files. 
Most of the security orchestration platforms have considered threat intelligence as an essential element to 
identify attack behavior at an early stage [30, 49, 51]. Security orchestration with Global Threat Intelligence 
Platform (GTIP) [30] incorporates proactive defense technologies including threat intelligence. There are 
several open source threat intelligence platforms that provide high accuracy and coverage [47]. Each has 
their own specialized techniques for data extraction. A threat intelligence data may also suffer from quality 
issues such as accuracy, completeness, consistency, timeliness, and relevance [53]. Filtering, configuration, 
and searching options are not available in some of the current threat intelligence tools. Xiaojing et al. have 
identified 45 blogs that are operated by renowned organizations and practitioners to cover major security 
incidents [47]. These blogs consistently publish verified IOCs that a security orchestration platform utilizes 
for updating the threat intelligence information. 
4.2.2. Planning Module. We consider the cybersecurity playbook as a planning module that outlines the 
steps to respond to an incident, including incident qualification, triage, investigation, containment, 
notification, and post-attack analysis [23, 84, 86, 94, 96]. A playbook arranges security operation into a 
human-led security workflow that is a coordinated set of activities performed by various components to 
complete an incident response within an organization. According to an organization’s policy and 
infrastructure, a security playbook creates smart branching workflows and also supports the activities of 
SIEM, firewall, threat intelligence, IPS, vulnerability reporting, and ticketing systems [66, 73, 114]. Incident 
response playbook contains various course of actions. The FireEye has proposed incident response 
playbook as one of the key features of security orchestration [80]. To provide continuous proactive security, 
FireEye designs appropriate orchestration platform according to an organization’s requirements, deploys 
and tests it in the organization’s environment, integrates security tools with third-party solutions and 
operates it to execute appropriate plan against a security threat. Orchestration of Software-defined Security 
Services [31] design playbooks to store the actions (operation plans) related to important security events 
(security alerts). The security administrators take necessary steps based on the actions mentioned in the 
playbooks [31].  
Zonouz et al. in [42] have proposed a consequence tree (a tree of critical assets defined an 
administrator) to capture critical IT assets and organization security requirements. Each organization has 
their own list and priority of critical assets. The consequence tree is built using this list of critical assets. 
Kamal et al. [45] have considered the Incident Response Plan (IRP) as a crucial component of collaboration 
engineering. The authors highlighted that creating IRP through collaboration among a group of experts is 
challenging when the time is very short. The PSI policy abstraction helps an administrator to define policies 
in terms of what they do rather than the details how to do them [33]. With the help of PSI engine, an 
administrator can define how the traffic of a particular device should be processed and where to forward 
them. The security orchestration platform requires a proper planning of the incidents. Without proper 
planning and preparation, a security orchestration platform ends up automating a lousy process that might 
slow people down [23]. 
4.2.3. Detection Module. The detection module detects the anomalies and attacks around the 
organizations based on the gather and pre-processed data, shared insight, and knowledge of the playbook. 
Analyzer and the decision service unit are the two-main core components of the detection module. In the 
following paragraphs, we have briefly described these two components. 
Analyser: The analyzer receives aggregated alters from the alerts pre-processors, correlates them, 
validates the assumptions and if possible, predicts future threats and targets. The analyzer performs an 
automated analysis of a system, analysis of logic unit, and enrich data to make sense of it [28, 60, 62-64, 84, 
86, 94]. A set of papers have reported correlating suspicious evidence provided by distributed security 
entities to identify distributed attacks [43, 44, 46, 47, 66, 74, 84]. Enterprise Level Security Orchestrator 
[16] can analyze alert data and detect threats. It stores all the threats data in its analysis storage. It 
generates a set of rules or traffic patterns as a decision table by finding the correlation among different 
alerts. Similarly, the PSI performs packet pre-processing and event pre-processing before analyzing the 
data [33]. Kenaza et al. [43] have used ontological reasoning approach to correlate alerts. The proposed 
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ontology-based event correlation architecture has a correlation module, that works as a reasoner. Feitosa 
et al. [49] proposed a collaborative solution to detect intrusion and anomalies by analyzing the co-creation 
of events and alerts among different subnetworks. It derives policy decision based on the contextual data 
it receives from an orchestration engine [49]. The solution proposed by [47]  tried to find correlation among 
IOC data to check relation among threat data. A core part of their solution is the Analyzer. Seclius [42] tracks 
the interaction among files and process to probabilistically identify dependencies among assets of an 
organization. 
Decision Service Unit: Most of the reviewed security orchestration systems have decision services unit 
that orchestrates the activities for automated decision-making [78, 81, 84, 95]. The decision service unit 
makes security policy decision(s) related to vulnerability and threat assessment and assessment of security 
enforcement system [60]. The decision service unit receives summarized information from analyzer and 
collector about suspicious behavior and generates decision-based on them [49]. The finite state machine 
(finite automata, Markov chains or stochastic regular grammars) is a popular method used in the decision 
process. For example, the security orchestration framework in [17] uses the policy orchestration state 
machine to provide policy decision to the security orchestration state machines and deriving the policy 
decision based on the contextual data received from the security orchestration server engine. Policy 
decision logics are extracted from individual control. The decision logics enable additional, ad-hoc, smart 
logic, and intelligence analytics to be injected into the real-time policy decisions. Thus, policy decision logics 
capture context and drive actions staged over multiple points in space and time [17]. Similarly, Seclius [42] 
has constructed dependency graph and consequence tree of existing assets to probabilistically determine 
the comprised assets, prioritize alerts, and provide security state of different assets to the administrator.  
Koyama et al. [30] have used an optimal decision-making technology and diverse threat intelligence 
with a variety of security sensors and appliances to choose the correct countermeasure for stopping an 
attacker’s internet-based actions. Utilising the workflow engine is also a popular strategy to take a decision. 
For example, Rochford et al. [28] have decided the actions based on the workflow engine. The reviewed 
study, SOSDSec, generates a security service binding upon finding matching among security requirements 
and abstract services [31] which contains the information related to assessment and its service provider. 
A change in the security control and module causes a change in the security service binding. Similarly, the 
differentiated search engine in OADS miner discussed in [49] is used to generate the decision based on the 
queries received from end users or system tools. The decision service unit makes all the decisions related 
to the OADS miner like activation, deactivation, and parameter change and stores the configuration 
parameter in a file. The decision service unit also provides recommendation after analyzing information 
about attacks. The alert buffer of security orchestrator proposed in [16], continuously sends updates to a 
dashboard. 
4.3. Automation Unit 
The automated unit performs all the automated task based on the decision generated by the decision 
unit and analysis of the workflow. The remediation unit and actioners performer help a security 
orchestration platform to deal with the automated task. In the following paragraphs, the role of the 
remediation module and actioners performers have been described in detail. 
4.3.1. Remediation Module. The remediation module promptly configures countermeasure and security 
operation based on the decisions of the detection module to remediate threats [32, 65, 84, 90, 94]. A 
remediation module reported in [30] performs automatic security configuration for responding against and 
mitigating the effects of the attacks. The remediation module brings automation in security orchestration 
solutions and delivers significant ROI and drive downtime to remediation [90]. The OADS system proposed 
in [49] has a central controller to implement the established sequence of actions with a process, including 
exceptions and conditions. Enterprise level security orchestrator [16] has a remediation module that has 
two main elements: response storage and remediation engine. The remediation engine detects threats 
patterns. It has a learning logic module that uses machine learning algorithms. Threat data are stored in 
the response storage once received from the remediation engine. Koyama et al. [51] have discussed the 
technology to rapidly recover from the effect of cyber-attacks. The proposed remediation module 
immediately isolates the affected area after detecting attacks based on the information from a detection 
module and provides recommendations about detected attacks for further analysis and evaluation. These 
actions of the proposed system are expected to reduce a security operator’s burden. The SoSDSec system 
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proposed in [31] incorporates a model layer to manage security policies and security models of 
organization’s assets. The security orchestrator reads and updates policies to achieve automation. SDSec 
orchestrator is a key element to achieve security orchestration and automation. It works with the 
communication and coordination subsystem. The communication with security controls is also performed 
through the orchestrator. The SDSec orchestrator communicates with virtualized functions to coordinate 
security tasks and thus minimizes management dependencies on security appliances. 
4.3.2. Action Performer. A controller or action performer controls communication and actions [84]. 
Security staff can directly control an orchestration platform’s various components through a controller [32, 
65]. The action performer performs many actions such as send an e-mail to the relevant persons, block an 
IP address, isolate a virtual machine, trigger a process to initiate a scan and run a script to perform auto-
configuration [28]. Poornachandran et al. [32] have referred the data management processing system as 
security consoles and administrator console that works as a tracking station. The tools enable staff to tackle 
diverse and ongoing issues [94]. The communication module can be considered as a subcomponent of the 
controller. The job of the communication module is to bridge between several modules of a security 
orchestration platform. In addition to maintaining a secure exchange of threat data and policy information, 
an orchestration platform requires a secure broker or DXL [17, 32, 47].  Elshoush et al. [44] have considered 
the communication module as a bridge between security solutions and decision-making module. The DXL 
fabric of [17] provides command and control functions across the entire network. Published, subscribe 
notification, query response, and push notification are different types of message of DXL layer. Demisto has 
provided DBot and ChatOps to perform intelligence automation, and collaboration among operations [81]. 
5. Motivation behind Security Orchestration 
This section reports the result of RQ2: “What challenges security orchestration is intended to solve?” We 
have identified and analyzed the challenges that promote the practice of security orchestration. Our 
analysis of the extracted data enables us to identify several challenges as shown in Fig. 8. We have classified 
the challenges under technical and socio-technical aspects of security orchestration. 
 
Fig. 8 Challenges that promote Security Orchestration 
5.1. Technical Challenges 
Technical challenges are related to technical issues that lead to security problems such as limitations of 
the IDS to accurately detect intrusion and interact with other security tools, conflict among several security 
tools in simultaneous run, and dynamic change of tools behavior. Following sub-sections describe the 
technical challenges that security orchestration intends to solve. 
5.1.1. Lack of Interoperability Among Isolated Security Tools. Our analysis of the reviewed papers reveals 
that most medium to large organizations uses several security tools (e.g., IDS, Firewall, and SIEM) to secure 
their critical data and infrastructure [12, 56, 102, 103, 118]. The main reason ends up installing several types 
of products is that different vendors provide distinct dimensions of security services and solutions [11, 16, 
89, 112, 115]. Moreover, organizations lack a single security tool that can encompass the whole of the 
security operations. Isolated security tools are considered as a lousy communicator and cannot always 
assume the presence of another tool [12, 30, 31, 49, 84, 101]. Several security tools fail to guarantee the 
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protection of an organization’s infrastructure as they work in an isolated way and focus on solving the 
specific problem [62, 65, 86]. Several of the reviewed papers have mentioned that it is extremely difficult 
for a single security solution to detect the distributed and complex behavior of cybersecurity attacks. 
Moreover, security operators are usually unable to understand their organizational security state through 
individual security tools working separately [42]. For taking incident response decisions, it is necessary to 
integrate and analyze the activities of different tools, which are usually designed to work independently 
and limited by their own services [30, 62, 65]. These tools have their own data representations and 
interpretation mechanisms. The disparate tools have inconsistent workflow [108], disconnected and non-
integrated architecture [12] and lack of standardization for data exchange between different tools [53]. 
These are some of the reasons that network administrators and security experts find it difficult to 
appropriately configure and integrate the activities of multivendor security tools that means there is a need 
of continuous involvement of humans in the entire process of security incident response. The lack of 
interoperability among security tools results in more responsibility on human experts (briefly explained in 
section 5.2) and leads to redundant, complex, inefficient incident response process. Existing security 
management and risk assessment solutions are not designed to collaborate [77]. These solutions do not 
consider several aspects that affect the evaluation criteria of the threats and vulnerabilities thus make the 
security procedures incomplete. As a result, with generic security policies, the security management 
becomes inefficient [77]. 
5.1.2. Lack of Tools to Automate Proactive Response. Our review has revealed that there is a lack of tools 
to automate the key security activities such as threat intelligence collection and update, alert validation, 
task investigation, response, and resolution [28, 84, 102, 106, 112, 114]. Organizations need learning tools 
to automate the manual repetitive tasks. FireEye mentioned security experts spend 95%of their time on 
the manual execution of repeatable tasks [108]. AT&T’s cyber securities insight report reveals 90% of their 
reported cyber-attacks were from known vulnerabilities [112]. Whilst security defender needs to update 
new threat intelligence quickly, they usually fail to instantly update the threat intelligence [17, 47], 
promptly update software patches to remove vulnerabilities [66], keep every security tools up to date 
[102], and enforce policies as soon as they are agreed upon [33]. For a large network, it is time-consuming 
to update hosts from different vendors that leave the system open for intruder [66, 84, 86]. Ntouskas et al. 
[77] proposed lack of automated collaborative tools to embed security standards, methodologies, tools, and 
guidelines to train a security management team as one of the key reasons’ organizations lag behind in 
fulfilling their security needs. Fujitsu emphasizes, an efficient SOC requires automation of the process of 
threat defense life-cycle [75] to help free up security analysts’ time and keep the system up to date. 
5.1.3. Limitation of Existing Tools to Provide Required Services. Several of the reviewed studies have 
mentioned that the existing security tools are unable to give full protection to organizations infrastructure 
[28, 97, 102, 113, 115]. According to Verizon's 2017 Data Breach Investigation Report [3], 43% of data 
breaches utilizes phishing, and it becomes clear that trying to prevent every attack is like playing whack-a-
mole. The single standalone detection engine also fails to provide complete visibility of network 
infrastructure to security staff. In most cases, the detection system generates a large number of false alerts 
that require extensive analysis [12, 13, 18, 84, 108]. Security experts are overwhelmed with alerts and 
spend more time investigating and validating false and repetitive alerts. In 2015, Hewlett-Packard reported 
48% of their recorded cyber-attacks were from known vulnerabilities that are five or four years old [112].  
Organizations need tools that can learn from experts’ behavior. There is a lack of platform where security 
staff can easily integrate security tools, network infrastructure and gather complete visibility of their 
security systems [28, 89, 93]. Weilinger et al. [68] have reported that IT security tools used by security 
practitioners fail to address the complexity of their interactions. According to Demisto [114], the 
inappropriate interface between technology and personnel is the reason security personnel being 
ineffective and inefficient. The IT security tools provide insufficient support for collaboration, coordination, 
and cooperation among security practitioners and stakeholders. 
5.2. Socio-Technical Challenges 
Socio-technical challenges are related to the organizational process, policies and rules with respect to 
cybersecurity. Socio-technical aspects of security in an organization include matters involving business 
process, skill, resource management, policies, law enforcement and interaction of people with the technical 
system. Many of the challenges faced by the security community are socio-technical rather than technical. 
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Socio-technical challenges are difficult to project as it involves interactions between individuals, groups 
and technical systems. Our analysis of the extracted data indicates some of the key socio-technical 
challenges that organizations face while handling the security incident. These challenges work as the 
primary drivers of security orchestration. 
5.2.1. More Responsibility and Workload on Human Experts. Cybersecurity staff are entrusted with 
several types of responsibilities that include analysing and dealing with sophisticated attacks [51], manual 
consultation and writing custom codes to validate alerts through threat intelligence [13, 75, 107], manual 
extraction of key attributes from threat intelligence data and linking it with relevant data [64], evaluating 
alerts, correlating data and coordinating the appropriate responses [11] and investigating results [66, 115]. 
Several papers [12, 13, 30, 31, 51] have reported that the response toward a security incident highly 
depends on the manual activities performed by security experts. A security expert needs to combine several 
security tools [68], update threat intelligence, involve multiple administrative systems, include multiple 
control tools [30], analyze data from new tools [101] and deal with the interaction of inter-component of 
the modern complex system [21, 56] to perform their tasks. The manual steps are usually the main reason 
for longer incident respond time  [11, 89, 97, 101]. A delay in the security incident analysis happens as a 
security expert needs to continuously shift between multiple disparate tools to manage different pieces of 
information from multiple tools [23, 102, 108]. Fujitsu’s SOC has considered the manual consultation as 
one of the most time-consuming steps in incident response process [75].  
Hexadite reported [13] that it takes around 45 days for an organization to resolve cyber-attack due to 
manual response to incidents. According to a set of studies [47, 64, 103, 114], security staff finds difficulties 
to manually extract features from huge volume of threat intelligence data. Manual configuration, 
integration of several security tools, implementation and updates are associated with misconfiguration, 
erroneous response, and policy enforcement [53, 56, 97, 103]. Moreover, security staff face difficulty in 
manually dealing with the interaction of inter-component of the modern complex system [56]. Several 
papers [42, 43, 107] have indicated that manually dealing with thousands of alerts to choose the right 
course of actions result in missing critical attack information. 
5.2.2. Lack of Skills and Expertise. Security practitioners have reported [11-13, 23, 101, 108, 114] lack 
of skilled security staff as one of the major reasons for organizational failure to deal with security breaches. 
Large enterprises are spending billions of dollars on buying and deploying several types of security tools 
[102, 111] that need up-to-date knowledge and expertise in different aspects of security attacks and 
countermeasures. Organizations face difficulties to find and retain security staff with the required expertise 
[23]. Security staffs require a decade to acquire the expertise to fight against sophisticated cybersecurity 
attacks [97].  It has been highlighted that a global shortage of 1.5 to 2 million cyber security professionals 
may occur by 2019 [96, 122]  and 3.5 million by 2021 [28]. According to CyberSeek, cybersecurity data 
tools [123], 40,000 jobs for information security analysts remain empty each year in the USA where 
organization struggle to fill 200,000 other security-related jobs. Organizations have few security experts to 
deal with thousands of incidents that they are receiving each day [12, 23]. Security staffs need to have an 
overall knowledge about an organization security policy, network infrastructure, and security tools. One 
paper reported that organizations are continuously shifting toward modern technology paradigms (e.g., 
cloud computing, mobile computing, and IoT) that lead to an expanded security attack surface and needs 
security knowledge, incident response skills and resources for each technology initiatives [106]. 
5.2.3. Lack of Regulation and Policy Framework. One of the major challenges in an organizational 
security is lack of a fully developed framework for conducting IRP [45], performing coordination and 
collaboration among incident response [61], seamless implementation and deployment of policies [17]. 
Some of the challenges mentioned in the reviewed papers include failure to provide clear definition of 
unwanted traffic and network behaviour [49], significant difficulties in providing clear guidelines to deal 
with new security mechanisms [31, 68, 73], failure in providing appropriate training for security 
management [77], lack of guidelines for conducting incident response planning [45] and severe challenges 
in enforcing and managing security policies. All these types of challenges result in security staff failing in 
taking a proactive decision against cybersecurity attacks. 
5.2.4. Lack of Coordination and Collaboration Among Stakeholders and Security Teams. Coordination and 
collaboration among security staff are important to analyze complex threat behavior. Most cybersecurity 
communities lack collaborative processes for information sharing. Several papers [20, 45, 46, 48, 55, 68, 
78] have highlighted the requirements for having a combined knowledge and experience from several 
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domain experts due to the complexity of network flow and log data analysis. Most of the incident response 
teams follow no collaborative process while planning how to respond to a particular incident which results 
in poor strategies plan [45]. Several papers [30, 59, 78] reveal that stakeholders from different 
organizations are unwilling to share threat intelligence with each other. Jeong et al. [78] have reported 
organizations’ fear of losing reputation is one of the reasons for their unwillingness to share their security 
circumstances with other organizations. Zhao et al. [59], has discussed that many state and federal 
governments have developed threat information sharing services which are limited to sharing threat 
intelligence with the central government. The external organization could not get benefit from this kind of 
threat information sharing. Still, there are no collaborations among different organizations working in the 
same domain [30]. 
Table 5 presents the mapping of the benefits that organizations get through the functionality discussed 
in section 3.2 that aims to solve the challenges discussed above in this section. 
Table 5  Mapping summary of key activities performed by security orchestration with benefits 
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 6. Taxonomy of Security Orchestration 
In this section, we have summarized the results that answer to RQ3: “What types of solutions have been 
proposed to adopt security orchestration?”. We have highlighted the key techniques, tools, and strategies 
used by practitioners and researchers in the realization of security orchestration. Most of the reviewed 
studies have  
proposed platform-based architecture as a strategy for incorporating security solutions to support their 
integration, orchestration, and automation [12, 13, 80]. McAfee has focused on four engineering 
approaches to automate the entire threat defense life-cycle - partnership centric, platform-based 
approaches, reinvented experiences and cloud-centric [12]. All these four approaches are integrated into a 
single platform to take the benefits of each. We consider the platform-based approach is the core 
engineering strategy. The orchestration platform is designed to automate various activities of threat 
defense life cycle. This review has enabled us to propose a taxonomy of security orchestration to support a 
systematic comparison and analysis of the existing security orchestration solutions as depicted in Fig.  9. 
The proposed taxonomy consists of several dimensions and sub-dimension for classifying security 
orchestration techniques. 
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Fig.  9 A Taxonomy of Orchestration Platform 
6.1. Execution Environment 
To help speedy organizational responses to security incidents with fewer resources, a security 
orchestration platform’s execution environment can be supported by four types of technological solutions 
that are expected to work together to solve the security issues and challenges; for example, a combination 
of cloud-delivered data security system and endpoint security for Infrastructure as a service multiple 
vendor with multi-tenancy features, these solutions need to be considered right in a  
virtual context. For example, ETSI has proposed a security orchestrator for a hybrid network consisting 
of a physical network and virtualized network [52]. In the following subsection, we discuss the four 
execution environments for security orchestration solutions. 
6.1.1. Endpoint. Most of the organizations have several siloed security solutions on their endpoints. 
Installing several security solutions in each endpoint and managing endpoint in a large IT infrastructure 
are becoming challenging and inefficient [92]. An organization needs to monitor, assess, and control all the 
endpoint devices connected with organizations’ network to provide end to end threat protection [89, 92, 
95]. McAfee has considered endpoint security architecture from which an organization can expect agent 
consolidation. In this review, we consider any autonomous entity or software program that can perform 
actions as an agent. A security orchestration platform can deliver consolidation at the endpoint which can 
even be the entire portfolio depedning on time [12]. Security orchestration agent can reside in various 
endpoints storage (RAM, HDD, or SSD) [32].  
HEXADITE has proposed security orchestration and automation solutions AIRS that helps an enterprise 
to connect detection, networks and endpoint security systems. Though the proposed platform seems to be 
agentless, it uses a non-persistent agent that inject dissolvable probe on endpoints during investigation 
[13]. Similar to Hexadite, Demisto [115] proposed an architecture that consists of dissolve agent for data 
collection from endpoint. The workflow tool CounterACT proposed by ForeScout uses multiple agentless 
discovery methods and integration techniques. CounterACT employs a combination of active and passive 
discovery methods to classify organizational devices based on the network [111]. Without installing any 
software agent or enrolling any management unit to a device, it first connects the device to the network. 
This reduces the overhead of an administrator to check each device and manually assign policies to each 
endpoint. The resilience engine proposed by NTT controls multiple devices at appropriate points according 
to the type of attacks to isolate the affected regions [51]. The security orchestration framework also 
supports distributed endpoint with DXL over an enterprise network [17]. DXL is built on top of Enterprise 
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Service Bus (ESB) technology and provide an abstraction layer between different types of connected 
endpoint devices. Through a security orchestration platform organization can provide constant protection 
irrespective of where an endpoint device is located. 
6.1.2. Private and Public Cloud. Cloud computing and its related technologies have created the need 
for new generation security technologies. An orchestration platform can be built as a single integrated 
solution to provide cloud-delivered data security [12, 92]. The motive of cloud platform is to build software 
as a service with the required levels of performance and availability. An organization can easily integrate 
their security module into a cloud [92]. Example of such services includes web protection, sandboxing, 
security broker, data loss prevention and encryption. A cloud security platform continues to support next-
generation platform that is built beyond VMware and Amazon web services to add Azure, OpenStack, 
Docker containers and emerging services. McAfee has proposed McAfee cloud ePO software to support 
consolidated management across their cloud management technology [12]. The work proposed in [31] is 
designed to deal with heterogeneous cloud environment and automated security operation in Software 
Defined Infrastructure environment. The proposed solutions handle VM movement over dynamic 
infrastructure and provide transparent security management facilities. The resilience security technology 
for rapid recovery from cyber-attacks also works for network services in cloud environments [51]. The 
enterprise-level security orchestrator installs a mirror of the security orchestration in a cloud [16]. They 
have proposed security orchestration engine for server and client and the orchestration solutions can be 
used in public, private or even external cloud [16]. Using cloud as an execution environment helps an 
organization to have a scalable, flexible and adaptable infrastructure. 
6.1.3. Hybrid Data Center. The evolvement of a data center to SDDC has created new security-related 
challenges for organizations. Additionally, the increasing trend of distributing more workload on data 
center and public cloud has also increased security challenges. The security orchestration system and 
resilience engine proposed by NTT are mainly designed for a data center [30, 51]. McAfee aims to build an 
integrated security system to deliver visibility and security to a cloud-enabled data center [12]. McAfee’s 
security orchestration platform includes global load balancing infrastructure with Content Delivery 
Network (CDN)/ peering data center [12]. Intel has introduced the open security controller, a security 
orchestration platform to orchestrate virtual security in SDDC [29]. The purpose of this platform is to make 
security management visible, effective, agile and scalable by providing automated, dynamic and 
synchronized security services for software-defined infrastructure. It provides seamless brokering services 
between SDN and VNF. It is optimized for OpenStack and VMware cloud environment. A security 
orchestration platform gives visibility across network and server tiers and public/private cloud data 
centers [92]. Dynamic micro-segmentation is performed for private clouds and workload auto-discovery is 
done for public clouds  [12, 29]. The concept of micro-segmentation restricts the access and tailor security 
configurations. This gives better threat protection and faster remediation than siloed approaches. Security 
orchestration helps security administrator to span their security model from organizational data center 
[92]. 
6.1.4. Threat Management. A SOC suffers from a large volume of data, events and Indicator of IOC to 
prioritize true attack in process or in the golden hour of post-breach [44, 46, 47]. A security orchestration 
platform helps in analyzing the security threat data by providing security analysis, threat and vulnerability 
management, attack detection, attack investigation and streamlines incident response [12, 30, 51, 59, 92, 
95]. Threat management includes prioritize threats in progress and also in the golden hour of post breaches 
[12]. It helps security analytics to continue advanced data management, risk assessment, correlation and 
deal with both volume of security data and increasing sophistication of analysis [49, 53, 54, 59]. It 
automatically investigates attacks during and after a breach. It also provides both on-premise and cloud-
based analysis. Threat Connect has proposed an intelligence-driven platform to manage both internal and 
external threat data and turn them into actinal threat intelligence [86]. Security orchestration provides a 
central place for data aggregation, analysis and enrichment of security threat data.  Security orchestration 
allows providing technologies like attack reconstruction that helps an organization to identify and response 
at a full attack level not just at an event or malware level. An organization can use a security orchestration 
platform to centrally manage the threat and automate entire life cycle of threat defense. 
6.2. Security Automation Strategy 
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Our review has revealed that a security orchestration platform uses a combination of several types of 
automation strategies. Orchestration of different automated steps is needed for effective incident 
responses that suit all types of organizational activities that are integration, aggregation of data, auto 
investigation or analysis, finding proper course of actions and deciding remediation process. The security 
automation realization approaches concern specific methods/tools. HEXADITE has highlighted five distinct 
approaches to security automation adopted by current vendors – workflow tools, orchestration tools, 
scripting tools, prioritization tools and intelligence security automation [104]. From the analysis of the 
reviewed literature, we consider the intelligence security automation as security orchestration platform 
that includes some of the available automation tools to orchestrate and automate the incident response 
process. Demisto has mentioned automation and human tasks need to be interweaved and worked together 
in a seamless fashion to achieve the desirable goal [115]. We have outlined the automation strategies that 
are used by practitioners in various organizations. 
6.2.1. Auto Integration. We have placed the connecting or integration tools that are used to 
automatically connect existing security tools through APIs to streamline an incident response process 
Under this category. Whilst some practitioners have mentioned the connecting tools as orchestration tools 
[104], this is not the only purpose of using a security orchestration platform. A security orchestration 
platform has tools to automatically connect and integrate a full stack of security systems [11, 80, 104]. 
Several reviewed papers have also proposed to connect organizational hardware, software, and control 
unit into a security orchestration platform [113, 121]. This work as a layer of connective fabric that makes 
the tools work together. The integration tools help isolated security tools to interoperate with each other. 
Organizations can easily buy a new point of product as the integration tools automatically connect and 
integrate new systems into existing one and make the necessary changes in a system. An organization can 
dynamically insert security functions into any workgroup based on their policies [29].  The ControlFabric 
interface by ForeScout uses an open standard based API to perform bi-direction integration [101]. Building 
a fully autonomous integrated set of tools is a very difficult due to the heterogeneous nature of multivendor 
security solutions. The work reported in [17] allows the integration of a third party software. Security 
management software can connect to the orchestration framework by connecting to DXL. It provides all 
the command control functions across the entire network. The DXL also provides API embedded with 
McAfee agent. However, if a security orchestration process is not well-defined [104], there are not many 
benefits in just connecting the existing security tools. An orchestration platform must have some well-
designed framework and workflow to perform the required actions. 
6.2.2. Workflow. Organizations usually use workflow tools to streamline an incident response flow and 
communication. Workflow tools are depicted as a solution to gather and enhance alerts that automatically 
send instructions to analyst, auditor, and other security systems [11, 29, 90, 101, 104, 115]. Some workflow 
tools provide a standard framework specifying user roles and types of actions need to take for certain types 
of alerts [28, 84, 86, 90, 95, 104].  FireEye has built a security orchestrator to design a workflow [80]. A 
security orchestrator can help organizations to better organize incident response flows with a built-in 
ticketing system. According to HEXADITE and KOMAND, the workflow tools automate data gathering and 
communication processes, leaving the investigation and remediation actions for security staff [11, 104]. 
Security team creates a sequence of automated tasks to perform the tasks in a logical sequence with a 
chained data flow [19, 21, 84, 86, 115]. Demisto has mentioned designing the workflow for automation of 
playbook to weave human analyst into the middle of these workflows and playbooks. Though some 
practitioners have designed the workflow in such a way that it will also trigger investigation and 
remediation actions [29, 84]. Some workflow tools like the one proposed by McAfee, drive cross endpoint 
workflow and built natively into an endpoint security architecture [12]. ForeScout has built CounterACT 
that uses a rule engine and a workflow engine to automate the workflow for instant decision making to deal 
with security incidents [101]. This helps an organization to automate the security process across mobility 
management and endpoint platform. Invotas Inc. has designed a multistage workflow which includes the 
workflow of automatically connecting different security tools [121]. Majority of the security orchestration 
practitioners have built the workflow based on use case scenarios [11, 13, 80, 90, 101, 114]. An 
organization can define its strategies about how to respond to certain security events. The cybersecurity 
playbooks keep a record of this in the form of a workflow rule that an orchestrator uses to autonomously 
control attacks [23, 31, 84, 90]. Workflow tools do not enable the integration of heterogeneous inter-
organizational information and security systems.  
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6.2.3. Scripting. Scripting tools perform actions based on custom code written by security staff, who 
use the scripting tools to configure existing playbook, security tools and policies. An organization requires 
skilled developers to consistently write and maintain code by performing in-depth investigation [23, 90, 
104]. Scripting tools can be considered as an execution engine that executes the script or configurable code. 
The security orchestration system proposed in [30, 51] uses scenario-based autonomous control of 
multiple virtual appliances to implement security measures. A security operator can implement the 
measures regardless of their skill level. Scripting capabilities also include writing custom workflow and 
integration [90]. An organization with resources to investigate and remediate threats can use scripting 
tools to perform automation. An organization needs to have both budgets and resources for using scripting 
tools. Defining new policies and designing scripts according to organizations’ budgets and resources can 
be considered under this category. The policy maker explicitly writes code to reconfigure some parts of a 
network. The enterprise-level security orchestration has an orchestrator routine to make call to safeguard 
software packages via automated interfaces provided by safeguard interface modules [16]. 
6.2.4. Prioritization. Prioritization tools help security team to decide critical security alerts. These 
types of tools normally assign a score to alerts to reflect more critical and urgent alerts to prioritize security 
events [21, 43, 66, 75, 86, 104]. Most organizations have some sort of prioritization tools with their 
detection system that automatically investigates and correlate alerts to reduce false assumptions and give 
experts a list of critical alerts, which are produced by organizational detection system. Major data breaches 
show that in most cases organizational security teams missed critical alerts. SIEM [43, 84, 114] is a popular 
prioritization tool that collects and aggregates alerts from different security tools and prioritizes true alerts 
and discards false alerts. Tayeb et al. [43] have proposed an ontological reasoning approaches to reduce 
the false alerts by correlating alerts. Some of the orchestration platforms have used the existing SIEM 
technology to prioritize the alerts. 
6.2.5. Learning. A set of studies have used Artificial Intelligence (AI) technique and game theory model 
to make security system intelligent [21, 44, 48, 66, 73, 77]. McAfee has proposed to expand the security 
orchestration platform capabilities by including behavioral security; for example, pre-execution, post-
execution, machine learning and more [12]. Several of the reviewed studies [12, 21, 79] use machine 
learning based solutions to analyze security behavior. AIRS platform, an orchestration platform, proposed 
by HEXADITE uses AI to automate the activities of several security tools [107]. HEXADITE has proposed 
the used of AI as a critical capability for automated security technology [107]. Without automatically 
learning, it is not possible for any security orchestration platform to predict uncertainties. Demisto 
introduces ChatBot – a learning tool to combine intelligent automation with collaborative, human social 
learning and experience [114]. For certain threat behavior, defining rules and designing workflow work 
fine. With a world full of uncertainty, an orchestration platform must be able to learn from a security 
expert’s behavior and threat data. A combination of AI techniques (such as Machine Learning and Genetic 
Algorithm) has been used in security orchestration platforms’ automated learning modules. Seclius [42] 
uses a set of instruments to learn from the dependency of systems’ assets and captures information flow 
between file and process. The authors have also developed an algorithm to use with the set of instruments 
[42]. As a result, an administrator does not need to define the low-level input. 
6.2.6. Plugin and Module. For this category, we have classified small programs or software that 
organizations can independently select and install based on the required configuration. A security 
orchestration platform can integrate plug-ins to automate various activities and create workflow [65, 90]. 
Siemplify has introduced a plugin framework for security orchestration that makes security tools 
accessible and easy to integrate into incident response workflow and automation [90]. Komand has 
introduced several plugins to include in an organization’s environment [11]. Each plugin has a set of tasks 
for a specific set of activities. FireEye orchestrator also uses predefined plugins to perform workflow 
integration [80]. This makes a security team more agile. Module based automation strategy helps an 
organization to choose an integration module based on organizational infrastructure, policies, and 
configuration. ForeScout Module supports more than 70 third party solutions to automate various activities 
of security tools [101]. ForeScout open integration module allows customers, system integrators and third 
party product vendors to integrate their products with ForeScout’s CounterACT and communicate with 
each other. Both module and plug-in add specific features to an orchestration platform that is why we have 
placed them under a single category. 
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6.3. Deployment Model 
A security orchestration platform includes several types of components. The platform might have 
several structures to manage its components and activities. Some of them form a distributed structure, 
while others become part of a central management site for a large-scale deployment [65].  ForeScout has 
mentioned three deployment models for their proposed orchestration and automation platform: 
centralized, distributed, and hybrid deployment architecture [111]. 
6.3.1. Centralized Deployment. In a centralized deployment architecture, an organization has a 
centralize orchestration manager to communicate, manage and deploy policies to multiple orchestration 
appliances in a data center or major sites. Several papers [19, 65, 86, 89, 90, 93, 118] have indicated that a 
centralized security orchestration solution is needed to provide security operation central team better 
understanding of the state of security throughout an organization for faster and efficient incident response 
actions. For example,  NetSec has proposed a central management for a large-scale deployment of 
orchestration platform [65]. Whereas, ThreatConnect [86] has proposed a central intelligence driven 
platform to manage threat data in a single place. Centralized management configuration is necessary for 
optimal security enforcement. In this type of deployment, the appliances need IP connectivity to remote 
sites in order to manage devices and other endpoints located there. Traffic from the remote location is sent 
to a centralized orchestration platform via a predefined interface for monitoring and assessment. A security 
orchestration appliance can monitor the activities of the user directory, DNS and DHCP to detect threats or 
potential rogue activity and initial remediation [111]. An organization manager contains the database of 
endpoints (active or passive) from the appliances it manages [64]. 
6.3.2. Distributed Deployment. An organization can use a decentralized deployment model for utilizing 
a mixture of security orchestration component located in both central facility and various remote sites [59]. 
A security orchestration controller manages and controls the activities, provides policies to orchestration 
service consumers, physical or virtual and maintains a database of active and inactive endpoints. A 
distributed deployment enables the use of virtual firewalls, virtual security services, browser redirection, 
and endpoint authentication to a server when a local orchestration platform is at that site. A distributed 
organization, large data center, cloud platform and large IT infrastructure require distributed deployment 
of security policies and protocol that can be achieved by distributed security orchestration appliances over 
multiple endpoints. Incorporating distributed security analysis and monitoring allow an organization to 
deliver tighter security policies and better protection against emerging cyber threats [92]. ForeScout [111] 
has introduced orchestration organization controller functions that are the central notification points, 
where the communication occurs via email or syslog and bi-directional SIEM services via CEF or LEEF 
messaging to perform endpoints actions and to notify systems to endpoint status. Radwane et al. [46] 
propose a distributed collaborative architecture to perform cooperation and placement of defense entities 
on organizational systems to defend against DDoS attacks. They have utilized the concept of distributed 
hash table and overlay network to perform the distribution and placement of security solutions. Fung et al. 
[48] have used Chord overlay network to implement the protocol of their distributed system. 
6.3.3. Hybrid Deployment. The hybrid deployment model uses a mixture of security orchestration 
platform appliances in a central location and at remote sites. The orchestration controller maintains a 
database of the infrastructure and issues policies for the appliances. Chen et al. have proposed a centralized 
controller for managing the distribution of appliances [64]. A hybrid deployment implementation supports 
virtual firewalls, browser redirection, and authentication verification of an endpoint to a server when a 
local security orchestration appliance is deployed at that site [111]. Elshoush et al. [44] have highlighted 
several hybrid deployment models for a collaborative intrusion detection system. Their proposed 
architecture can also be considered a hybrid architecture. The security orchestration framework reported 
in [17] performs distributed sensing over server and client. The proposed system performs a centralized 
aggregation of data and enforcement policies both on the server and clients. In [17], a centralized server 
has the visibility to see the entire context and communication layer DXL that is highly scalable based on an 
elastic architecture that supports multiple deployment options. Multiple controls can be connected and 
deployed at diverse locations with distinct types of control and visibility where a data exchange layer (DXL) 
provides a fabric to help them operate as a unified system (super-control). 
6.4. Mode of Task 
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A security orchestration platform generates the remediation actions that are both automated and semi-
automated  [80, 104]. Some actions need human involvement which depends on organizational policies 
and rules.  Security orchestration requires a combination of machine drive and human-led process 
workflow to optimize security operations [90, 115]. Actions can be triggered by an analyst or triggered 
when a new artifact is added to an incident [115]. As the security orchestration platform works as an 
intelligence assistance for the security experts, who should conduct automation selectively based on their 
resources and needs. The incident response can be fully automated or semi-automated  [84, 90] depending 
on the nature of the tasks to be carried. For example, a task such as notifying stakeholders, assigning 
incidents and enriching data with context can be automated safely, but the actual containment of data 
breach, analysis of unknown threats frequently require human in the loop [84]. The online evaluation 
framework proposed in [42] does not automatically respond to an attack. Instead, it is designed to help 
security administrators by providing situational awareness capability. Xiaojing et al. [47] have made the 
feature extraction and analysis of threat intelligence data fully automated. They have proposed a fully 
automated cyber threat intelligence gathering solutions to lessen the manual job of threat intelligence 
analysis. 
A security orchestration system based on global threat intelligence platform provides both fully 
automated and semi-automated tasks [51] that help to automatically classify the detected cybersecurity 
attack, investigate whether or not the available countermeasures are possible. The system also investigates 
the possibilities of automated response (automatic generation and notification of response 
recommendations that guide the decisions of a security staff). A platform allows users to choose their level 
of security and types of responses. A user can take control of the system to combine various security 
sensors and appliances. Similar to these the system in [31], an administrator specifies the service 
requirements based on security controls and needs. 
6.5. Resource Type 
The analysis of the reviewed material reveals that the functionality and performance of security 
orchestration depend on human expertise and security software of an organization. We consider 
organizations’ security software and human resources as two most important resources of a security 
orchestration platform. Building a security orchestration platform on top of a clumsy list of security 
software that is supported by unskilled security team will not bring many benefits to organizations. 
6.5.1. Security Software Resource. In this category, we consider the existing security solutions provided 
by third party vendors or owned by an organization. Most of the security orchestration platforms assume 
that organizations already own multivendor security tools. Several papers have mentioned a range of 
security tools while designing orchestration platform for small to the medium organizations [13, 17, 29, 49, 
60, 66, 77, 101, 108]. Some key types of security tools used by organizations are SIEM, forensics tools, 
signature-based control tools, firewall, IDS/IPS, anti-malware, antivirus, perimeter security tools, ticketing 
solutions, traffic inspection tools, compliance tools and vulnerability scanners [43, 108, 115]. McAfee has 
classified the existing security tools into attack detection and attack investigation [12]. Komand has 
mentioned IDSs, firewalls, ticketing tools, and team communication tools as the minimum numbers of tools 
an organization must have to build a security orchestration platform [11]. To further enhance the 
performance, Komand has considered threat intelligence, malware analysis tools, and forensics tools as the 
next layer of tools [11]. Komand has also considered some additional tools such as applications for 
vulnerability scanning, phishing investigations, threat hunting, monitoring tools, and malware protection 
tools [11]. Most of the reviewed literature has considered anomaly detector to analyze traffic for 
identification of potential attacks and abnormal traffic. Kenaza et al. [43] have performed cooperation 
among IDS, network scanner and vulnerability scanner to reduce alerts volume. Feitosa et al. [49] have 
mentioned  two types of anomaly detectors: hardware and software based. They  have mentioned several 
hardware tools to capture network traffic [49]. These tools can also inspect network traffic in real time. 
Several tools, techniques, and systems are used as software-based anomaly detectors such as, IDS (Snort, 
BrO, & Prelude), Honeypots (Honeyd, & Nepenthes), and open software prototypes [31, 49]. The software 
security units give alerts to an orchestrator and receive scripts command from an orchestrator. 
6.5.2. Human Resource. Human is an essential part of a security orchestration platform. Security 
analysts, security engineers, forensic experts, network administrators, security administrators, director of 
security operation center including security orchestration designers and security orchestration and 
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automation engineers are considered as human resources for a security orchestration platform [20, 44, 61, 
65, 68, 73-75, 77, 98]. Demisto has considered any security staff who perform day to day security operation 
as a human resource [114]. An organization must have experts to assess organizations’ security 
infrastructure. According to a report by NSSLab, [20], a security architecture can ensure the organization 
security for an assigned level across the entire threat defence life cycle by assessing organizations existing 
security infrastructure. Before setting up orchestration operation, the security orchestration designers 
need to communicate and work closely with security analyst to make sure that the orchestrated process is 
well-understood [23, 90, 94, 96]. Security experts are the one who perform coordination, timing, 
moderation, prioritization and enforcement algorithm for policies based on organization requirements 
[20]. Human resources must be able to fully leverage the power of a security orchestration solution [90]. 
A human-centric security orchestration model is necessary where the dashboard and planning tools will 
make automation work. A security orchestration platform is built to work as an intelligence assistance of a 
security expert. According to Bruce Schneier, automation is only possible in the environment of strong 
certainty, where everything is related to the planning of certain actions and synchronization of activities 
[14]. On the other hand, the uncertain world needs direct execution, initiative, and prioritized command. 
He emphasizes that it is not possible to replace humans, rather, humans are required in security 
orchestration to make the machine intelligence effective for security response actions. Zonouz et al. [42] 
have mentioned an online evaluation framework to help administrators. For a coordination model, the 
work reported in [77] has proposed four groups of users where they have considered security and business 
continuity team as a group and administrator as another group. The other two groups are a group of local 
users and group of external or corporate users [77]. Security teams vary by size, vertical and expertise and 
what an organization needs from threat intelligence [86]. A security orchestration platform should be 
designed in a way that can work with all sizes, maturity levels, and groups of a security team. 
7. Discussion 
This review has initially introduced and analyzed the relevant aspects that motivate the need of security 
orchestration. Throughout this review, we have identified and categorized existing security orchestration 
solutions. There is an increasing realization that security orchestration platforms can enable significant 
progress towards achieving the goal of security as a service/ utility. Over the years, several technologies 
such as SIEM and Distributed Intrusion Detection System have been proposed as solutions to the challenge 
of providing security as a service. However, security orchestration is still in its early stage of development 
that has a significant potential for research and innovation. One of the areas of research is standardization 
as most of the security vendors are coming up with their own orchestration platform solutions that have 
proprietary interfaces or plugins to integrate and access different security tools and services.  This 
heterogeneity works as one of the major barriers to large-scale implementation and realization of security 
orchestration. Hence, security orchestration solutions require new levels of collaboration and 
performance. The solutions also need to be adaptive to organizational structures that are quite dynamic in 
these days. According to a report of Research and Markets [124], by 2021, the security orchestration 
market price will hit 1.6 billion USD. A security orchestration platform needs to engage security staff fast 
enough to make a significant difference in the response time. Security orchestration platform needs 
significant amount of research to create results for immediate incident response application to unforeseen 
cybersecurity events. This review has enabled us to assert that large scale empirical studies of the security 
orchestration platforms and practices in the “Wild” will greatly benefit the efforts aimed at addressing the 
obstacles to security orchestration in different organizational settings. 
7.1. Open Issues in Security Orchestration 
This literature review constitutes a first step towards reaching a common consensus as we examined 
several state-of-the-art and state-of-the-practice security orchestration platforms and compared them with 
the existing literature. Our review has revealed that the existing security orchestration solutions suffer 
from several open issues. We have analyzed the open issues from three key aspects of security 
orchestration – people, process, and technology as shown in Fig.  10. 
 Security orchestration is mainly aimed at increasing automation of the security related tasks that 
primarily rely on human expertise. The human need to be involved in the loop of orchestration and  
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       automation. With automation, security orchestration requires experts who can easily take the 
benefit of the automated decision and take the control when automation is inappropriate. There 
needs to be significant collaboration among different level of staffs involved in dealing with the 
security orchestration processes and technologies as each team may have different responsibilities, 
priorities,  
 
 
Fig.  10 Open issues in security orchestration platform 
and metrics. Whilst security orchestration automation efforts are based on scenarios known to 
security practitioners, security vendors and organisations need to develop and deploy more formal 
workflows and playbooks for security orchestration. Experts involved in the process of 
orchestration and automation require proper training to gain a common understanding of the 
workflow, tools and techniques. An organization requires a security architect who can ensure the 
involvement of risk management and guidance to managed policies. Though one of the motivations 
behind security orchestration is to handle the collaboration among stakeholders and security 
experts, the security orchestration platform itself requires strong collaboration among business 
risk owners, risk assessment team, security operation center and IT infrastructure manager. The 
analysis of our review has identified that the current security industry lacks training related to 
secure practices. That means the organizations and security community both need to train the 
current and future staffs to keep pace with the wide adoption of security orchestration platforms 
and conceptualize the data needed to acquire the insight into security events. 
 The incident response process must be aligned with an organization’s existing IT operation 
framework. The organization needs to have a clear idea of what they can automate and what they 
need to orchestrate. Hence, there is no agreement on what to automate and what to orchestrate. 
Nevertheless, some research also refers to orchestration but does not specify its meaning, they often 
focus on building plugins to integrate existing solutions. Security orchestration platform needs to 
access organization policies and other security solutions data to make relevant decisions. Whilst 
security staff is empowered to streamline incidents including addressing the issues raised by an 
Open Issues
People
Little involvement and collaboration among different level of 
staffs during the orchestration and automation
Lack of security architect for risk and policy management
No holistic training for staff to understand security orchestration 
platform, integrated tools & incident response workflow
Process
Insufficient alignment of Incident response process with 
organizations existing IT operational framework
No clear agreement among vendors on what need to orchestrate 
and what can be automated
Privacy and policy violation due to incorporating learning 
capability to orchestration platform
Lack of willingness to share knowledge and experience
No guideline to assess maturity of orchestration process and 
incorporate automation into the system 
Technology
Lack of modeling notation and language to support integraiton of 
securlty information at runtime
Increasing diversity of integrated security solutions due to 
dynamic change of attack patterns
Insecure communication among different components of the 
system
Increasing vulnerability due to integration of new tools
Little research on  AI for scalable and flexible security 
orchestration and integration 
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orchestration platform, most organizations do not share their threat intelligence with others. 
This situation can lead to trust issues among organizations. 
 Organizations need to assess their respective maturity in the security orchestration and automation 
[84]. There is still no guidance about how to assess an orchestration process maturity and know 
when and how to incorporate automation into its systems. 
 Whilst there is an increasing recognition of the importance of security orchestration and 
automation, the practice of security orchestration is unbalanced. Technology should reach a level to 
further support the development of an agreement on the definition of orchestration and automation 
in cybersecurity space. With the advancement of technologies, new vulnerabilities are found and 
exploited every day. The dynamic change of attack patterns causes the increase of diverse security 
solutions. The orchestration platform should be adaptable with emerging technologies. As stated in 
the previous sections, orchestration in cybersecurity constitutes an interdisciplinary research area 
that adopts concepts from research in cybersecurity solutions, SIEM, cooperative IDS, distributed 
IDS, orchestrated and automated incident response. There is a need of significant research on the 
modeling notations and languages to support the integration of security-relevant information into 
streamlining incident response workflow at runtime. There has been no systematic approach to 
provide a standard API to perform the integration and handle the communication among different 
components of an orchestration platform. There are a very few orchestration platforms that provide 
plugins or support for all the existing multi-vendor security solutions. One key challenge is to secure 
the integration and communication of security systems. Another area of future research and 
development is the application of AI in security automation technology, which can extend, and/or 
replace where possible, human cognitive processes for security decisions. The existing 
orchestration platforms are not scalable and flexible enough to handle the heterogeneity of security 
team structure, sizes, and expertise levels. 
7.2. Reference Architecture for Security Orchestration 
Security orchestration is an emerging area of research and practice. There is not much accumulated 
knowledge and experience available to support industrial decisions making for different aspects of security 
processes and tools for security orchestration. Siemplify [118] suggested the importance to have a delicate 
balance between human intervention and automation. New security solutions are expected to be adaptable 
to the existing orchestration platforms. However, a centralized platform for security orchestration and 
automation usually incurs huge overhead cost and can be a single point of failure. Due to the ubiquitous 
realization of cloud, edge, fog, and mobile computing, there needs to make suitable changes in the ways of 
deploying security orchestration platforms, which consider certain properties such as context specific, 
knowledge sharing, self-reinforcing and dynamicity. The services provided by security orchestration and 
automation should be fragmented into siloed. It should perform multiple actions in parallel to unleashed 
the best results out of it and take action against a threat without delay. This requires choosing appropriate 
architecture, for example, microservice, service-oriented, monolithic, and so forth. 
A Reference Architecture (RA) for security orchestration will help define a model to characterize 
different components of a security orchestration platform and the relationship among different 
components of the platform. The RA can provide an overview of the flow of communication underpins a 
workflow. An orchestration platform might have a distribution layer which needs to consider the response 
time, redundancy and accuracy. An orchestration platform needs a well-designed and rigorously evaluated 
architecture that can support easy integration and smooth interoperability of components and tools 
developed for various domains by different vendors. There needs to be architecture level support for 
visibility and comprehensibility of the functioning and interactions of different components of an 
orchestration platform that should operate transparently. An orchestration platform’s architecture is 
expected to be dynamically adaptable to the changing security vectors. It is a significant research challenge 
to design and evaluate a suitable reference architecture for a large-scale realization and materialization of 
security orchestration platforms. 
The MLR has identified the essential components of a security orchestration platform that is expected 
to have certain quality attributes such as scalability and flexibility. We can conclude that there is an urgent 
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need of conducting research for identifying and leveraging suitable styles/patterns in designing and 
evaluating architectures for  security orchestration solutions. 
7.3. Limitations of this Research 
This study has some potential limitations. Since security orchestration is an emerging paradigm with 
mixed and inconsistent terms, the search string used to identify the relevant papers may not have included 
some words that might be used for security orchestration. The inclusion and exclusion criteria used to 
assess and select the reviewed studies have been defined by the research team. The focus of this review 
does not include an in-depth discussion of the limitations of the reported solutions. We encourage a reader 
to take the above-mentioned limitations into consideration while using the findings from this paper. 
Moreover, some organizations’ security orchestration requirements may not fully be met by any of the 
reported security orchestration technologies. 
8. Conclusion and Future Work 
Security experts usually get overwhelmed by the task of monitoring and handling an increasingly huge 
pool of security alerts generated by a diverse set of security tools. Hence, they may fail to act in a timely 
manner to deal with security incidents due to the manual and repetitive job of receiving and combining 
security alert information from multi-vendor security tools. Security orchestration is aimed at supporting 
security staff for effectively and efficiently monitoring and dealing with security incidents by enabling 
coordination and collaboration among the heterogeneous independent security tools. Integrating and 
orchestrating various activities of security tools in an organization need a comprehensive view of a security 
orchestration platform. Recently, all sort of organizations have started taking interest in adopting security 
orchestration. However, academic research is yet to catch up with the increasing trend of technological 
innovation and practical adoption of security orchestration. Security tool vendors do not share a 
common/similar understanding while developing and supporting tools, process, and technologies for 
security orchestration 
We have systematically selected and rigorously analyzed the security orchestration solutions provided 
by various practitioners and researchers to provide a good understanding of this emerging paradigm. We 
also intended to explore the challenges and the possible future trends of security orchestration research 
and practice. Our review has tried to address three research questions: 1) What is Security Orchestration? 
2) What challenges security orchestration intend to solve? 3) What types of solutions have been proposed? We 
have identified and analyzed critical aspects of security orchestration solutions founded in 95 papers, 
which have been selected based on a pre-designed review protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this MLR 
can be considered as the first attempt toward systematically reviewing and analysing the literature on 
security orchestration. 
The analysis of the extracted data to answer the RQ1(i.e., What is Security Orchestration?) enabled us to 
explore several definitions of security orchestration provided by practitioners and come up with a working 
definition for the research on the topic of security orchestration. The definition of security orchestration 
provided in this paper is expected to help practitioners and researchers interested in this topic. Most of the 
reviewed literature has considered security orchestration as a platform that integrates and unifies various 
security tools and activities for prompt response to security incidents. The review has identified the key 
functional and non-functional requirements that a security orchestration platform. Our analysis of the 
identified functional requirements has revealed three key areas of focus of security orchestration: 1) 
unification - which is to unify security tools activities 2) orchestration - which relates to the process of 
translating complex process into streamlined workflow and 3) automation - which is the process to select 
suitable course of actions to enable automated incident response. Our review has also identified the key 
components of a security orchestration.  
A security orchestration platform is expected to address several technical and socio-technical challenges 
for which the review has identified the key techniques, tools, and strategies. We have proposed a taxonomy 
for a security orchestration platform from five key dimensions: 1) execution environment, 2) automation 
strategies, 3) deployment type, 4) task mode and 5) resource type; which is further split into sub-
dimensions. This taxonomy gives the view of the multidisciplinary nature of a security orchestration 
platform. An organization can compare several security orchestration solutions using the reported 
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taxonomy, which can provide security practitioners with insights into security orchestration platforms’ 
usability in different but interdependent processes. 
Despite the widespread adoption of security orchestration technologies and practices in recent years, 
several management issues (such as legal issues, trust management, adaptability, scalability, and usability) 
have mostly been neglected and need to be addressed. This review has identified several future research 
areas as follows: 
 There is a dearth of solid studies aimed at evaluating the usefulness (e.g., effectiveness, usability, 
and accuracy) of security orchestration tools and techniques. There is an important need of research 
for defining evaluation criteria and metrics to empirically evaluate different aspects of security 
orchestration solutions including the promised functional and quality requirements. 
 There should more research on designing suitable reference architectures for supporting the 
activities of security orchestration platforms, whose common and variable layers can be known to 
security tools developers and integrators who are responsible for integrating a diverse set of 
security tools into a security orchestration platform. A reference architecture will also help to 
decide where to automate security processes and where a security orchestration engine is required. 
 There is a need of research on the expectations and mechanisms of ensuring privacy of data when 
it travel among different security tools, connected with a security orchestration platform. 
 As the next step, we plan to carry out research on some of the identified areas such as providing a 
security orchestration platform’ reference architecture for guiding how to identify the required 
components of a security orchestration, the interconnection among the components, and data and 
control flow among these components. Since security orchestration for the organization is at an 
early stage of development and adoption, we believe that this review paper will serve as an 
important reference for future research in this domain. 
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Appendix 
Table 6. Table of Notation 
Acronym Abbreviation/ Description Acronym Abbreviation/ Description 
AI Artificial Intelligence MLR Multi-vocal Literature Review 
AIRS Automated Incident Response Solution NFV  Network Function Virtualization  
API Application Programming Interface NTT Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
DBot Demisto’s chatbot  NVD National Vulnerability Database 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service OADS Orchestration-oriented Anomaly Detection 
System 
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol OVAL Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language 
DNS Domain Name System ROI Return on Investment 
DXL Data Exchange Layer RQ Research Question 
EC Exclusion Criteria SDDC Software Defined Data Centre 
ETSI European Telecommunication 
Standard Institute  
SDN Software Defined Network 
IC Inclusion Criteria SDSec Software Defined Security 
IDS Intrusion Detection System SE Software Engineering 
IDMEF Intrusion Detection Message Exchange 
Format 
SIEM Security Information and Event Management 
IOC Indicator of Compromise SLR Systematic Literature Review 
IPS Intrusion Prevention System SOSDSec Service-Oriented Software-Defined Security 
IRP Incident Response Plan STIX Structured Threat Information Expression 
IT Information Technology TAXII Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence 
Information 
LEEF Log Event Extended Format PSI Premise-aware Security Instrumentation 
MD5 Message Digest 5 algorithm VNF Virtual Network Function 
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